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THREE PAPERS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND
MACROECONOMICS
ARTHUR V. SMITH
Boston University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2019
Major Professor: Stefania Garetto, Ph.D., Associate Professor of
Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters in international economics and macroeco-
nomics. The rst chapter examines the impact of agents’ educational and occupational
choices on the relationship between trade and inequality. The second chapter studies the
consequences of multinational banks’ organizational choices for the international trans-
mission of shocks. The third chapter considers the importance of geography for the struc-
tural estimation of real consumption growth.
The rst chapter revisits a classic question in international economics: what is the
impact of trade on inequality? Empirically, I document that trade is positively associ-
ated with the share of high-skilled hours worked but not with the skill premium. This is
true in both the short and long run. To explain this puzzle, I develop a tractable general
equilibrium model featuring skill bias in productivity and endogenous educational and
occupational choices. Quantitatively, I show the relevance of this model for the case of
China’s entry into the WTO and use the model to examine the impact of counterfactual
trade policies.
The second chapter (with Stefania Garetto and José L. Fillat) examines how multi-
national banks’ regulatory structures aect the transmission of nancial shocks across
v
countries. In the case of the European sovereign debt crisis, we demonstrate that the U.S.
branches of foreign parent banks were more likely to contract their lending and lose de-
posits in response to stress in the parent country than were the subsidiaries of foreign
parents. We develop a structural model of global banking, consistent with stylized facts
about the banking industry. We quantify this model and use it as a laboratory to examine
the impact of counterfactual regulatory regimes.
The third chapter (with Jonathon P. Lecznar) studies the role of geography when incor-
porating product entry and exit into structural methods for estimating real consumption
growth. We document three new facts related to geographic dierences in consumption:
(1) consumers in separate markets buy dierent products, (2) a product’s market share
varies geographically conditional on relative price, and (3) product variety growth and its
cyclicality vary geographically. Quantitatively, we nd that focusing on changes in ag-
gregate product variety overstates real consumption growth by 2.75 percentage points.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Trade and Inequality: Educational and
Occupational Choices Matter
1.1 Introduction
What are the distributional consequences of trade? Much of the backlash to globalization
is centered on questions about the winners and losers of trade policy, and in particular
a concern that trade might amplify inequality. Classic trade theory predicts that trade
liberalizations will increase the wage gap between high- and low-skilled workers (the
skill premium) in skill-abundant countries, and decrease the skill premium in skill-scarce
countries. More recent literature suggests that trade increases demand for skilled labor in
all countries. However, fully evaluating the dierential eects of trade across skill groups
requires a general equilibrium analysis of its impact on both the demand and the supply
of skilled labor.
In this paper, I start by documenting a puzzling fact about recent cross country data:
changes in trade are positively associated with increases in the share of high-skilled hours
worked (skill intensity), but not with the skill premium. Consistent with recent literature,
these correlations suggest that trade increases demand for skilled labor, but it suggests
that the general equilibrium eect is felt through an increase in skill intensity rather than
the skill premium. To explain this puzzle, I develop a tractable, general equilibrium model
of trade wherein heterogeneous rms and skill-biased productivity increase demand for
skilled labor following a liberalization, while agents’ educational and occupational choices
2increase the supply of skilled labor, both in the long run and in the short run. I calibrate
this model, and simulate a reduction in trade barriers that results in an expansion of trade
similar to the one following China’s accession into the WTO. Consistent with the data,
endogenizing the skill supply response to trade mitigates the impact of trade on the skill
premium. While adjustments to skill supply through the occupational and educational
choice channels increase the gains from trade by up to 40%, these gains disproportionately
accrue to surviving rms rather than workers. Correspondingly, counterfactual exercises
indicate the amplication of harm done by a trade war through the long run reduction
in educational attainment. Moreover, counterfactual exercises on a reduction in the cost
of education demonstrate role of policy in reducing inequality between educated and un-
educated agents, as this channel inuences both the share of high-skilled labor and the
quality of competition.
Empirically, I examine the relationship between trade, skill intensity and the skill pre-
mium using data from 37 countries from 1995 to 2009. Exploiting variation in the log
changes in export share, there is an economically meaningful association between ex-
ports and skill intensity. However, there is no relationship between exports and the skill
premium. These ndings are true in the short run, using a stacked dierences approach,
and in the long run, examining long dierences over the period of the sample. Moreover,
these ndings hold for both skill-abundant and skill-scarce countries. This is consistent
with recent trade theories that predict an association between trade and skill demand
regardless of factor abundance, but puzzling in that the adjustment occurs in quantities
rather than prices.
To explain the observed facts, I develop a general equilibrium model of trade with het-
erogeneous rms featuring standard and novel ingredients. Consistent with the literature
on skill-bias in trade, the model features skill-biased productivity. This feature produces
the correlation between trade shares and relative demand for skilled labor in the model,
3which maps to skill intensity in the data. The model has two novel features. First, to match
the long run stability of the skill premium, I endogenize skill supply through schooling.
Second, to match the short run stability of the skill premium, I add occupational switch-
ing. I consider how each component aects the labor market equilibrium in response to
trade using comparative statics.
I introduce a skill-biased production technology as in (Burstein and Vogel, 2016), to
account for trade’s association with increased skill intensity in both skill-abundant and
skill-scarce countries. The skill-biased production technology implies that the largest,
most productive rms rely more heavily on high-skilled labor. As the largest, most pro-
ductive rms are also most likely to engage in trade, trade liberalizations increase demand
for skilled labor. If if the supply of high- and low-skilled labor were constant, the skill pre-
mium would increase.
I introduce educational choice to explain the long run association in the data between
trade and skill intensity rather than the skill premium. I model agents with heterogeneous
education costs, who decide between attending school and becoming either entrepreneurs
or high-skilled workers, or not attending school and remaining low-skilled workers. As
the benet of being an educated agent increases with trade, more agents choose to attend
school. This mechanism alone predicts a long run attenuation in the skill premium.
Finally, the occupational choice of educated agents explains the positive association
between trade and skill intensity in the short run. An educated agent may either become
an entrepreneur or provide high-skilled labor. Following a trade liberalization, the least
productive rms exit, with their entrepreneurs switching occupations to become high-
skilled workers. This increases skill intensity and mitigates the skill premium increases
associated with skill-biased productivity alone, mapping to the short run associations in
the data. Meanwhile, surviving entrepreneurs face less competition and increased prots.
This drives agents’ incentives to increase their educational attainment in the long run.
4Skill-biased productivity, educational choice and occupational choice are sucient in-
gredients to explain the observed facts in the data. Moreover, my model makes additional
predictions about the eect of increased trade on rms in the short run: namely, that prof-
itability increases and that the share of entrepreneurs declines. I nd evidence of increased
rm protability by documenting a negative association between trade and labor share
in the short run using the cross country data. I interpret this as suggesting an increase
in rm prots. To examine entrepreneurial exit, I use US state-level data. I document
that similar associations between trade, the skill premium and skill intensity occur across
US states as across countries. I then show an association between increases in trade and
declines in the share of entrepreneurs for US states.
To examine quantitative relevance of these mechanisms, I calibrate a three country
version of the model and simulate a trade liberalization similar to China’s entry into the
WTO. Shutting down the educational and occupational choice channels, my model pre-
dicts an increase in the skill premium consistent with the literature. Adding agent occu-
pational choice, skill intensity increases and the skill premium is stable, in line with the
short-run associations in the data. Incorporating educational choice is important to quan-
titatively match the long run increases in skill intensity. I also demonstrate the importance
of the changes in competition resulting from reductions in trade barriers in generating the
skill intensity eect relative to the counterfactual eect of a uniform increase in the de-
mand for skilled labor in the production technology. Moreover, adding factor adjustments
through the occupational and educational channels increases the welfare gains from trade
by 40% relative to standard models.
Though my model generates skill premium stability in the short run, surviving rms
gain relative to workers, increasing the benet of education. Increased education, on
the other hand, also increases competition between rms, transferring gains from rms
to workers of both types. I conduct counterfactual exercises on a reduction in education
5costs and nd it increases labor share, reduces rm prots and reduces inequality between
educated and uneducated agents. Finally, just as factor adjustments increase the benets
from trade openings, factor adjustments imply larger long run losses from a trade war
than standard models.
Understanding the relationship between trade and inequality is a rst-order issue in
international economics. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, upon a trade lib-
eralization, the skill premium should increase in skill-abundant countries and decrease
in skill-scarce countries. (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007), however, nd that early trade
liberalizations in developing (skill-scarce) economies are associated with increased in-
equality. Explanations for this include trade-induced skill-biased technological change,
e.g. (Acemoglu, 2003), capital-skill complementarity, e.g. (Parro, 2013), factor intensity
across traded and non-traded sectors, e.g. (Cravino and Sotelo, 2017), and skill-bias in
productivity, e.g. (Burstein and Vogel, 2016). The skill-bias mechanism aligns with evi-
dence that the largest, most productive rms engage most heavily in trade and rely more
heavily on high-skilled labor, e.g. (Bernard et al., 2007). While my empirical nding is
consistent with this mechanism for skill demand, my ndings suggest skill supply also
responds in equilibrium.
The literature considers both macro and microeconomic responses of skill supply to
trade. (Blanchard and Willmann, 2016) and (Blanchard and Olney, 2017) provide theoret-
ical rationale and empirical evidence respectively for increases in educational attainment
in response to trade at a macro level. (Edmunds et al., 2008) nd microeconomic evi-
dence of trade increasing schooling in India, while (Atkin, 2016) nd schooling responds
to changes in rewards to education following liberalizations in Mexico. (Danziger, 2017)
incorporates changes in the supply of skilled labor though schooling in a general equilib-
rium context, nding long-run skill premium stabilization through the educational chan-
nel. However, as I document an increase in skill intensity and not the skill premium in the
6short run, my model adds an occupational choice channel which both explains the short
run nding and motivates increased educational attainment in the long run.
Direct empirical estimation of the distributional consequences of trade is often dicult
to implement at the country level. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013, 2016) use the China
shock to estimate the eect of import competition on workers, oering invaluable insights
to the eects of trade on local markets. (Galle et al., 2017) and (Lee and Yi, 2017) provide
structural estimates of the general equilibrium eect of trade on the skill premium through
the impact of trade on cross-sector mobility by skill group. My model, in contrast, focuses
on eects of trade when agents can move across skill categories rather than across sectors.
I nd a one sector model with educational and occupational choice is sucient to explain
the observed facts in the data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1.2 presents novel stylized
facts about trade, the skill premium and skill intensity. In Section 1.3, I describe the model.
I then discuss its predictions for the impact of trade in Section 1.4 and its additional testable
implications in Section 1.5. In Section 1.6, I quantify the model and conduct counterfactual
analysis on the impact of a reduction in the cost of education. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Facts about Exports, Skill Intensity and the Skill Premium
In this section, I examine empirically the cross country relationship between exports, skill
intensity and the skill premium.
1.2.1 Data
I obtain data on wages and total hours worked by employee skill level in a sample of
37 countries covering the years 1995 to 2009 from the World Input Output Database,
Socio-Economic Account (WIOD-SEA).1 In WIOD-SEA, skill level is broken into three
1For sample selection details, see Appendix A.1.
7categories: high-skilled workers are those with some tertiary degree (e.g. at least an as-
sociate’s degree), middle-skilled workers have at least a high-school education and low-
skilled workers are those without a high school degree. For my main analysis, I group the
middle-skilled and low-skilled workers into one category (hereafter low-skilled workers),
but my results are robust to a variety of alternative groupings. I merge these data with
data on exports, imports and GDP for each country from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI) dataset.
1.2.2 Skill Premium, Skilled Hours and Exports, Short Run
To x ideas, I present two gures on the short run relationship between skill intensity,
the skill premium and exports. The left panel of Figure 1·1 illustrates the relationship
between the skill premium and exports. I plot two-year2 changes in the log ratio of high-
to low-skilled wages by two year changes in the log ratio of exports to GDP, controlling
for year xed eects. Surprisingly, I nd no relationship between changes in exports and
changes in the skill premium.
The right panel of Figure 1·1, illustrates the relationship between changes in the skill
intensity and changes in exports. I plot two-year changes in the ratio of high- to low-
skilled hours by two-year changes in the ratio of exports to GDP, nding a positive asso-
ciation between exports and the share of hours worked by high-skilled labor.
To further examine this nding, I specify a stacked dierences regression:










+ ft + i,t, (1.1)
where Y is the outcome variable of interest, either the skill premium or the ratio of high-
to low-skilled hours. The identifying source of variation is across country dierences
2I consider two year dierences as it smooths errors and accounts for the fact that some data in the
sample are imputations while maximizing the use of the sample period. One and three year dierences
produce similar results, as seen in Appendix A.2.
8Figure 1·1: Skill Premium and Skill Intensity by Export Percentage,
Short Run.
The left panel shows the relationship between changes in export share and changes in the skill premium.
The right panel shows the relationship between changes in export share and changes in the ratio of
high- to low-skilled hours worked. Both control for year xed eects. Data source: World Input-Output
Database, Socieo-Economic Accounts and World Bank World Development Indicators. All variables
dened in two-year log dierences for odd years, 1995-2009.
in changes in export percentage. The coecient of interest, β1, represents the eect of
changes in the log of export share on the log of the skill premium or the log of high- to
low-skilled hours. I include year xed eects, ft and cluster standard errors at the country
level. The plots in Figure 1·1 correspond directly to Columns 1 and 5 in Table 1.1. The
former shows a weak negative relationship between changes in export share and the skill
premium, while the latter shows a strong positive relationship between changes in export
share and changes in the ratio of high- to low-skilled workers.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that trade increases the demand for skilled
labor in skill-abundant countries, but decreases it in skill-scarce countries. I test this pre-
diction by grouping countries by their skill abundance in 1995, as high-, middle- and low-
skilled3. Columns 2-4 of Table 1.1 show that the near zero relationship between exports
and the skill premium is persistent across countries regardless of initial skill abundance,
3For the results in Table 1.1, I dene a country as skill abundant if more than 20% of their labor force was
high-skilled or less than 25% was low-skilled in 1995 (“Hi-S"), as skill scarce if more than 50% of the labor
force was low-skilled in 1995 (“Low-S"), with the remaining countries forming the middle skilled group
(“Mid-S"), which produces intuitive groupings at natural break points. See Appendix A.1 for details and
Appendix A.2 for alternate groupings.
9Table 1.1: Skill Premium and Skill Composition by Exports, Short
Run.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
wages wages wages wages hours hours hours hours
Exports/GDP -0.095* -0.095 0.007 -0.146 0.184*** 0.218*** 0.194 0.187**
(0.049) (0.059) (0.066) (0.099) (0.048) (0.070) (0.108) (0.075)
Group All Hi-S Mid-S Low-S All Hi-S Mid-S Low-S
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
N Obs 249 102 63 84 249 102 63 84
Columns (1) to (4) show the relationship between changes in export share and changes in the skill
premium. Columns (5) to (8) show the relationship between changes in export share and changes in
the ratio of high- to low-skilled hours worked. Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socio-
Economic Accounts and World Bank World Development Indicators. All variables dened in two-year
log dierences for odd years, 1995-2009.
while Columns 6-8 show the positive relationship between skill utilization and exports
does not depend on initial skill abundance.
In Appendix A.2, I consider several alternate specications of the short run relation-
ships and nd similar results. The positive relationship between skill intensity and exports
is robust to taking one, two or three year dierences in alternate years, while these spec-
ications show either no relationship or a slight negative relationship between the skill
premium and exports. Alternate denitions of trade (imports or total trade shares) yield
similar results. I also specify a panel regression, testing the relationships using country
and year xed eects and reach similar conclusions. Finally, regressions using log exports
and log GDP as a control variable yield similar results.
1.2.3 Skill Premium, Skilled Hours and Exports, Long Run
I further investigate the relationship between exports, the skill premium and skilled hours
in the long run. The left panel of Figure 1·2 illustrates the relationship between exports
and the skill premium in ten year dierences from 1995 to 2005. As before, I nd no
relationship between changes in exports and changes in the skill premium.
The right panel of Figure 1·2 illustrates a strong positive association between changes
in high-skilled hours and changes in the export share. I use ten year dierences as edu-
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Figure 1·2: Skill Premium and Skill Intensity by Export Percentage,
Long Run.
The left panel shows the relationship between changes in export share and changes in the skill pre-
mium. The right panel shows the relationship between changes in export share and changes in the ratio
of high- to low-skilled hours worked. Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socieo-Economic Ac-
counts and World Bank World Development Indicators. All variables dened in ten year log dierences.
cational attainment data some countries is imputed as constant after 2005. However, as
I show in Table 1.2, I nd similar results using ten year dierences in 2005, twelve year
dierences in 2007 and fourteen year dierences in 2009 for countries with available data.
Table 1.2: Skill Premium and Skill Composition by Exports, Long
Dierences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wages wages wages hours hours hours
Ex/GDP, 10yr Change -0.019 0.346*
(0.116) (0.173)
Ex/GDP, 12yr Change 0.079 0.283
(0.115) (0.199)
Ex/GDP, 14yr Change 0.055 0.243
(0.116) (0.185)
N Obs 36 33 32 36 33 32
Columns (1) to (3) show the relationship between changes in export share and changes in the skill
premium. Columns (4) to (6) show the relationship between changes in export share and changes in
the ratio of high- to low-skilled hours worked. Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socieo-
Economic Accounts and World Bank World Development Indicators. Columns 1 and 4 are ten year
dierences from 1995 to 2005; Columns 2 and 5 are twelve year dierences from 1995 to 2007; Columns
3 and 6 are fourteen year dierences from 1995 to 2009.
Columns 1-3 of Table 1.2 show no relationship between changes in export share and
the skill premium in the long run. Columns 4 of Table 1.2 shows a positive relationship
between increases in export share and increases in skilled hours over the ten year hori-
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zon, while Columns 5 and 6 show similar coecients over the twelve and fourteen year
horizons for the countries with available data.
The ndings in this section are consistent with the recent literature in that they sug-
gest a link between trade and demand for skilled labor in all countries, regardless of initial
skill abundance, is consistent with the ndings of Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) that trade
increases inequality in developing countries in contrast to the Stolper-Samuelson predic-
tions. However, my ndings are surprising in that the link is through skill intensity rather
than the skill premium. These data are later and cover a wider set of countries, and imply
a more complicated picture of the relationship between trade and skill. Models that only
take into account changes in demand for skilled labor can only account for changes in the
price of skill, not in its quantity.
1.3 Closed Economy Model
In Section 1.2, I presented a puzzling fact: increases in exports are associated with in-
creases in the quantity rather than the price of skilled labor in both the short and long run.
Understanding this puzzle requires examining how both demand and supply of skilled la-
bor respond to trade in general equilibrium. To capture the fact that trade is associated
with skill intensity in the data, regardless of a country’s initial skill-abundance, I nest
existing models of heterogeneous rms and skill-biased productivity. To reconcile the
long run association between trade and skill intensity rather than the skill premium, I
add agents’ educational choice. To account for the short run association of trade with
skill intensity, and to motivate increases in educational attainment despite skill premium
stability, I add educated agents’ occupational choice. These ingredients are sucient to
explain the observed facts. This model has rich predictions for rms that can be taken to
the data. Moreover, this is a tractable model that can be calibrated and used to conduct
counterfactual exercises.
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1.3.1 Preferences, Educational and Occupational Choices
There is a continuum of agents with identical constant elasticity of substitution (CES)










where q(ω) is the quantity of variety ω and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties.
Agents are heterogeneous in ability, and face an educational choice which determines
their skill level. Each agent has schooling ability, a ∼ F (a), distributed continuously
on the support [0, 1] and faces a binary schooling choice. If an agent does not attend
school (s = 0) he incurs no schooling cost, becomes a low-skilled worker and earns the
low-skilled wage, w`. If he attends school (s = 1), he incurs a schooling cost which is
inversely related to his ability:
C(s = 1|a) = cs(1− a), (1.3)
where cs is the cost incurred by the agent with the lowest ability. An agent of ability a
attends school if his expected income, I , conditional on schooling exceeds the low-skilled
wage plus schooling costs:
E(I|s = 1) ≥ w` + cs(1− a). (1.4)
Schooling costs are monotonic in ability and expected income from schooling is in-
dependent of ability, ensuring a single crossing property in educational choice4. For a
wide range of production technologies, it is easy to show there exists an interior thresh-
old a∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that only the workers with an ability a > a∗ choose to be educated.
4For this property, it is sucient for the benets of schooling to be weakly increasing in ability.
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Letting N be the exogenously dened mass of workers in an economy, the mass of low-
skilled workers is given by N` = N ∗ (1− F (a∗)).
An educated agent may either start a rm or become a high-skilled worker, earning
the high-skilled wage, wh. An educated agent has a management productivity draw z ∼
G(z) : (0,∞) → [0, 1] which determines the productivity of her rm if she decides to
become and entrepreneur. Letting pi(z, wh, w`) denote the prots from running a rm
with productivity z given high- and low-skilled wages, then an educated agent becomes
an entrepreneur if:
pi(z, wh, w`) ≥ wh. (1.5)
1.3.2 Technology and Firms’ Decisions
Each rm hires nh units of high-skilled labor and n` units of low skilled labor to produce
a single product variety. The production technology is skill-biased in productivity, as in
Burstein and Vogel (2016), such that a rm with productivity z produces:










ρ + (1− α) 1ρ (z −φ2 n`) ρ−1ρ ] ρρ−1 , (1.6)
where φ > 0 governs the degree of skill-bias in productivity. High- and low- skilled labor
are combined with a CES technology where ρ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and
α ∈ (0, 1) is a share parameter governing the relative importance of each skill type in the
production process. A > 0 is a common technology parameter.
Equation (1.6) implies that the relative share of high- to low-skilled labor at a rm run












Equation (1.7) shows that the share of high-skilled workers is increasing in a rm’s
productivity. The higher φ and ρ, the greater the dispersion in high- to low-skilled labor
shares across productivity draws. A higher the skill premium lowers the share of high-
skilled workers at all rms. This is governed by skill elasticity, with a high elasticity imply-
ing a high sensitivity to relative wages. A rm’s total cost is given by TC(F (z, n`, nh)) =



















Equation (1.8) demonstrates that a rm’s overall production costs are decreasing in
management productivity as long as φ < 2.5 As a rm’s reliance on high-skilled work-
ers is increasing in productivity, a lower skill premium disproportionally benets highly
productive rms.
As in Bernard, Jensen, Eaton and Kortum (2003) (BEJK), rms compete both within and
across varieties. Competition across varieties is standard and common to the literature on
heterogeneous rms and trade. Direct, Bertrand competition occurs within each variety
between prospective entrepreneurs. A prospective entrepreneur is dened as educated
agents who would become an entrepreneur in the absence of within-variety competition,
i.e. an educated agent whose productivity allows her to start a rm with monopolistically
competitive prots greater than or equal to the high skilled wage.
Three departures from the BEJK framework are necessary to incorporate the fact that
each rm represents a unique entrepreneur. First, the probability that a rm faces direct
competition is increasing in the share of prospective entrepreneurs. This ensures that
a reduction in the share of prospective entrepreneurs does not counterintuitively harm
those who reman. Second, to rationalize the occupational choice decision, Bertrand com-
5In the calibration I follow Burstein and Vogel (2016) and set φ = 1
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petition between prospective entrepreneurs in the same variety considers their outside
option, wh. Third, as each entrepreneur is an agent, the mass of product varieties Ω is
endogenously determined by the mass of producing entrepreneurs.
An educated agent always has the outside option of becoming a high-skilled worker
and receiving the high-skilled wage, wh. Therefore, an educated agent will only ever
become an entrepreneur if her prots, pim(z, wh, w`) as a monopolist are at least the high-
skilled wage. A prospective entrepreneur is an educated agent for whom this is true.




1−G(z∗))(1− F (a∗)). (1.9)
By assumption, each prospective entrepreneur faces at most one domestic competitor,6
with probability ν = (M/N)λ. The probability of facing a competitor is increasing in the
share prospective entrepreneurs M/N and λ > 0 is a shape parameter determining how
the share of prospective entrepreneurs aects the probability of direct competition.
All prospective entrepreneurs draw productivity from the same distribution. There-
fore, if a prospective entrepreneur faces direct competition, she faces one with a produc-
tivity drawn from the distribution of prospective entrepreneurs, whose PDF is given by:
h(z) =

0 if z < z∗
g(z)(
1−G(z∗)
) if z ≥ z∗. (1.10)
In addition to observing her own productivity, z, a prospective entrepreneur observes
6This is consistent with Burstein and Vogel (2016) who depart from BEJK by modeling two competitors
in each country drawn from an identical distribution, with the rst-best being the more productive of the
two and the second-best being the less productive. As the distribution of marginal costs cannot be solved
analytically due to the production function, the loss from this assumption is minor.
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whether or not she faces a rival, and, if she does, the rival’s productivity. The prospective
entrepreneur then makes a frictionless entry decision.
To rationalize the Bertrand competition game between two prospective entrepreneurs,
each prospective entrepreneur considers her opponent’s outside option, wh. Let two
prospective entrepreneurs have productivities z and z′ with z′ < z. As the Bertrand
competition framework suggests, only the more productive rm will enter and produce,
however, the price the entrepreneur’s rm charges, p(z, z′), will depend on the productiv-
ity of both agents. Dene pm(z) as the monopolist price of the prospective entrepreneur
with productivity z and p˜(z′) as the minimum price at which the prospective entrepreneur
with productivity z′ would earn at least wh in prots. Then the price of the entering rm
p(z, z′) is
p(z, z′) = min{pm(z), p˜(z′)}, (1.11)
rationalizing the entry decisions of both prospective entrepreneurs. Thus, as in BEJK, the
most ecient prospective entrepreneur produces and the second most ecient determines
mark-ups.
Each rm produces a single variety. Therefore, the mass of producing rms, MP ,
maps one-to-one into the variety space Ω. In the closed economy, the mass of producing
rms is given by:
MP = M
(





This model of competition nests other existing models of trade with heterogeneous
rms. Without skill-biased productivity, letting ν = 1, letting rms’ outside option be
earning zero, and letting MP be constant, this model is a one-sector version of BEJK.
Adding skill-biased productivity recovers a one-sector version of Burstein and Vogel (2016).
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Letting ν = 0 and MP = M this model nests Melitz (2003). Thus the parameter ν deter-
mines the degree to which additional rms increase direct price competition or increase
indirect competition through increased varieties.
Before summarizing the aggregate production quantities and inputs in this economy,
it is useful to dene some additional notation. First, let P (z) be the contribution of all
rms with productivity z to the price index, P :7
















Let Q ≡ U , then the quantity of a variety is q(ω) sold at price p(ω) is q(p(ω)) =
Q(p(ω)/P )−σ. Using these standard denitions and Equations (1.10), (1.9) and (1.11), I
dene Q(z) as the average quantity and R(z) as the average revenue of a rm with pro-
ductivity z:














with aggregate revenues, R = PQ = M
∫∞
z∗ R(z)h(z)dz.
Finally, Equation (1.7) gives the ratio of high- to low-skilled labor at a rm of produc-
tivity z and Equation (1.6) can be used to solve for the number of high- and low-skilled
workers that a rm of productivity z needs to produce a given quantity q, dh(z|q) and
7For notational convenience, Equation (1.13) has a PDF that integrates to less than one, this is accounted
for in Equation (1.14) by using M instead of MP .
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d`(z|q), respectively. Since rms face constant marginal costs, dene the average high-







and the average prots of a rm with productivity z are thus given by:
Π(z) = R(z)− whDh(z)− w`D`(z). (1.19)
1.3.3 Equilibrium
Denition 1. An equilibrium is dened by wages w`, wh, education threshold a∗, pro-
ductivity threshold z∗ and aggregate revenues R = PQ such that goods markets clear,
agents at the ability threshold are indierent between schooling and non-schooling, edu-
cated agents at the prospective entrepreneurial threshold are indierent between starting
a rm and becoming high-skilled workers, and labor markets clear:
E(I|s = 1) ≥ w` + cs(1− a∗) (1.20)
















In the closed economy, the supply of low-skilled workers is determined by the ed-
ucation threshold, a∗, while the supply of high-skilled workers is determined by a∗ the
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entrepreneurial threshold z∗ and the probability of competition ν. Relative demand for
high-skilled workers depends on the productivity distribution G(z) and the prevalence
and quality of direct competition for producing rms.
1.4 Open Economy Model
In an open economy, rms face additional direct and indirect competition from foreign
rms as in BEJK. The departures from BEJK made in the closed economy model directly
impact both within and across variety competition under trade. As in the standard BEJK
framework, there are J (potentially asymmetric) countries. Firms exporting from country
i to country j face iceberg trade costs, τi,j > 0 and xed costs fe,j .8
Consistent with the closed economy competition structure, rms face one prospective
entrepreneur in their own market and up to two in each other market. Dene νi as the
probability that a rm from country i faces competition from at least one prospective
















This formulation ensures that, as in the closed economy setting, the probability of
competition depends on the share of agents in each economy, so trade makes each rm
more likely to face a competitor.
Let the marginal cost of a rm from country i with productivity zi producing in
country j be ci,j(zi) = τi,jMC(zi). Let K index potentially competing entrepreneurs
8I assume rms face xed costs of entry into country j equal to the high-skilled wage in country j,
fe,j = wh,j . If fe,j < wh,j , the asymmetry in outside options may result in a less ecient foreign competitor
producing. If fe,j > wh,j , there is a secondary entry margin a la Melitz (2003), which I abstract from.
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for all productivities z1i ∈ (0,∞), z2i ≥ z1i . Equation (1.26) translates the ordering of rms
in the marginal cost space into country i’s productivity space, analogous to h(z) in the
closed economy. Notice, µi,j(z′i) rst order stochastically dominates h(z′i), which is to say
trade makes within-variety competition stier.
Finally, each entrepreneur is a real agent. As some prospective entrepreneurs do not
face direct competition, trade also increases indirect competition through an increase in
the mass of varieties, as in Melitz (2003). This ensures that each agent is properly ac-
counted for in the aggregate. In Appendix A.4, I show the relevant denitions for aggre-
gation and equilibrium in the multi-country setting.
I next examine how the mechanics of this model impact trade. Skill-bias in productiv-
ity, occupational choice and educational choice each play a key role in determining the
changes in the demand and supply for skilled labor following a reduction in trade barriers.
1.4.1 Impact of Trade: the Role of Skill-Biased Productivity
First, I consider the impact of trade with skill-biased productivity only, shutting down
both channels aecting skill supply. As discussed in the previous section, my model nests
a one-sector version of Burstein and Vogel (2016). As in their model, trade increases the
relative demand for skilled labor, increasing the skill premium:
Theorem 1. A symmetric reduction in trade barriers between two symmetric countries in-
creases relative demand for high-skilled labor. If the share of high-skilled labor is xed, this
increases the skill premium.
A reduction in iceberg trade costs, τi,j , decreases in the cost of exports. As τi,j > 1, a
rm in country i 6= j that becomes a lower cost producer in country j as a result of a reduc-
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tion in trade barriers must have pre-trade costs lower than the previous best producer. As
the two countries are symmetric, the rm in country i must be more productive, zi > zj .
Therefore, all shifts in production resulting from a reduction in trade barriers are shifts
from lower to higher productivity rms. As shown in Equation (1.7), higher productivity
rms rely more heavily on high-skilled labor, so relative demand for high-skilled labor
increases. If relative supply of skilled labor is constant, the skill premium must increase.
Theorem 1 is trivially extended to a multi-country setting. For asymmetric countries
or asymmetric reductions in trade barriers, it requires an quantitative solution. However,
it remains the case that in general reductions in export barriers are the most benecial to
the most productive rms, as they are most likely to become new exporters to a foreign
market. Meanwhile, the least productive rms are the most likely to be harmed by a
reduction in import barriers, as they are more likely be displaced by a new importer from
a foreign market. Solving Equations (1.17) and (1.18) using pre-liberalization wage rates,







which in practice will be the case unless the marginal cost distribution is highly asym-
metric across countries. This is unlikely as the undelying productivity distribution of
entrepreneurs is identical and the production function is identical up to a common tech-
nology parameter. The labor market clearing condition ensures the eects are similar
across countries. Assuming labor endowments are xed, an increase in demand for skilled
labor straightforwardly increases the skill premium.
This pattern of demand is consistent with my empirical nding that trade is associated
with an increase in relative demand for skilled labor in all countries, regardless of their
initial skill abundance. However, as trade is associated with skill intensity rather than the
skill premium, skill supply must also adjust.
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1.4.2 Impact of Trade: the Role of Occupational Choice
I now consider the impact of trade when adding occupational choice for educated agents.
This can be thought of as the short-run impact of a trade liberalization, before agents can
respond through the educational choice channel. Trade aects labor markets through the
occupational channel in three ways. First, trade induces entrepreneurial exit. Second, this
increases the relative supply of high-skilled workers, reducing the skill premium under
conditions described below. Third, the prots of remaining rms increase, increasing the
benet of becoming a high-skilled worker. I outline each of these predictions.
Theorem 2. A reduction in iceberg trade costs induces entrepreneurial exit through direct
competition and a reduction in prospective entrepreneurs through indirect competition.
A reduction τi,j causes entrepreneurs to exit through two channels. First, entrepreneurs
who newly face a direct foreign competitor with lower costs due to the reduction in τi,j
exit and become high-skilled workers. Second, as increased direct competition lowers
prices, P , indirect competition also increases. This Melitz (2003) channel implies that the
monopoly prots of the least productive rm in country i, pm(z∗i ) decline, while Theorem
1 stipulates that absent changes in relative supply, wh increases. Thus, prospective en-
trepreneurs with productivity z∗i exit as pm(z∗i ) < wh. Entrepreneurial exit through these
channels implies:
Theorem 3. A reduction in iceberg trade costs increases skill supply. If the skill ratio of
exiting rms (including their entrepreneur) is larger than the average skill ratio prior to the
trade cost reduction, the occupational choice channel reduces the skill premium.
The rst part of Theorem 3 follows directly from Theorem 2 as each exiting entrepreneur
or becomes a high-skilled worker. The second part of Theorem 3 states that occupational
choice mitigates the skill premium if the exit of entrepreneurs increases the supply of
high-skilled workers by more than it increases the relative demand for skilled workers
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(as more skilled entrepreneurs remain). Letting ExP (zj) be the probability that a rm
in country j with productivity zj exits as a result of a reduction in trade barriers then










where Dh(zj), D`(zj), Nh and N` are calculated using equilibrium values prior to a liber-
alization.
There are several forces aecting the relative benet of education. First, any increase
in the skill premium increases the return to education. Second, rms that expand their
production by newly entering a foreign market increase their protability, also increasing
the return to an education. Third, indirect competition increases through a reduction in
prices of some varieties, however, as Theorem 2 implies, the mass of producing rms,MP ,
decreases following a reduction in iceberg trade costs, softening the price index eect.
Finally, as some of the least productive prospective entrepreneurs exit, surviving en-
trepreneurs are more likely to produce as a monopolist, increasing their own prices. In
BEJK, iceberg trade costs do not aect average markups. In this case, the exit of en-
trepreneurs would unambiguously increase average markups if rms had the same pro-
ductivity distribution as in BEJK. Though the skill-bias channel does not permit the dis-
tributional assumptions, it remains suciently similar such that the markup eect dom-
inates in practice. Thus, while exact gains to education must be quantied, the majority
of forces push towards increased prots of surviving rms and thus increased returns to
education.
The occupational choice channel is consistent with the short run implications of the
data. Trade increases not only the demand for high-skilled labor, but also its supply. Thus,
it is possible for skill intensity to increase with a trade liberalization but for the skill pre-
mium to appear stable. Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs who do not exit gain from trade.
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Therefore, educated agents gain relative to uneducated agents. Increased gains from ed-
ucation incentivize more agents to attend school.
1.4.3 Impact of Trade: the Role of Educational Choice
In the long run, agents can adjust through both the occupational and educational channels.
As trade increases the value of education through a combination of an increase in the skill
premium and an increase in rm prots, the education threshold, a∗, decreases, increasing
the mass of educated agents. This increases skill intensity and also increases direct and
indirect competition across entrepreneurs.
The increase in the share of high-skilled workers is mechanical - increasing the mass of
educated agents increases the supply of high-skilled workers, placing downward pressure
on the skill premium. However, an increase in educated agents also increases the share of
prospective entrepreneurs, and producing entrepreneurs.
Theorem4. An increase in the share of prospective entrepreneurs and producing entrepreneurs
increases direct and indirect competition. This increases relative demand for skilled labor.
As in Equation (1.9), increasing a∗ mechanically increases the share of prospective
entrepreneurs M (holding z∗ constant). An increase in M (and thus ν) increases direct
competition, meaning producing entrepreneurs are more productive on average. More-
over, this increases indirect competition through an increase in rm productivities and
in the mass of producing rms, MP . Thus, z∗ increases as described through the occu-
pational choice channel. This also increases relative demand for skilled labor as the least
productive entrepreneurs exit.
As increases in education increase both the demand and supply of skilled labor, the
general equilibrium impact on the skill premium must be evaluated quantitatively. The
rst channel benets remaining uneducated agents relative to educated agents. The sec-
ond channel benets all workers relative to surviving entrepreneurs. The implications of
addition educational attainment to the model are consistent with an association between
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increased trade and increased skill intensity in the long run, along with continued skill
premium stability.
1.5 External Validation
In addition to predicting the observed facts from Section 2, the model has testable impli-
cations for rms in the short run. First, the model suggests the prots of surviving rms
increase following a reduction in trade barriers. Second, it implies that trade reduces en-
trepreneurship through the occupational choice channel. I nd suggestive evidence for
each empirically.
First, I test the prediction that surviving rms’ prots increase on average. If the
share of rms is constant or decreasing (as the model predicts), and labor’s share of GDP
declines, the average prots of surviving rms’ prots must increase. I examine the as-
sociation between trade and the labor to capital ratio using WIOD-SEA and WDI data.
In the WIOD-SEA, the capital share is dened as the residual of GDP less wages paid to
employees. In the model, this residual corresponds to the entrepreneurial share.
Table 1.3: Labor Share by Exports, Two Year Dierences.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L/K L/K L/K L/K
Exports/GDP -0.177** -0.320** -0.353* -0.102
(0.070) (0.125) (0.187) (0.104)
Group All Hi-S Mid-S Low-S
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country
N Obs 247 102 61 84
This table shows the relationship between the changes exports and changes in the share of GDP going to
labor. Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socieo-Economic Accounts and World Bank World
Development Indicators, years 1995-2009. All variables dened in two year log dierences.
In Table 1.3, I present evidence that trade is negatively associated with the labor to
capital ratio in the short run, consistent with the prediction that surviving entrepreneurs
gain from trade. This nding also runs contrary to models in which trade increases skill
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demand through a reduction in the costs of other inputs that are complimentary with
high-skilled labor. If this were the case, we would expect relative gains to accrue to high-
skilled labor rather than rms. This oers support for the skill-bias productivity mechanic
driving changes in productivity, and for the occupational choice channel driving distribu-
tional gains towards surviving entrepreneurs.
International entrepreneurship data suer from a limited availability and cross coun-
try denitional dierences. However, such data are available with consistent denitions
for US states. I obtain data on wages and hours by education level for US states from
2002-2016 from IPUMS-USA database (ACS sample), state level trade data from the Inter-
national Trade Administration and state level GDP data are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
First, as a baseline, I run the same analyses I conducted with the international sample
to establish the presence of a similar pattern in US states. Table 1.4 shows results for
the stacked two year dierence specication on the association between trade, the skill
premium and skill intensity in US states. Like the cross country results, Column 1 indicates
no relationship between changes in exports and changes in the skill premium. Column 2
indicates a positive relationship between changes in exports and changes in skill intensity
in US states.
I next examine further the relationship between trade and entrepreneurship at the
state level. As Column 3 of Table 1.4 shows, there is a negative relationship between
state level exports and state level entrepreneurship. This nding supports my model’s
prediction of an exit of entrepreneurs in the short run following a liberalization.
These ndings provide external validation of the model. In addition to being consistent
with the observed empirical facts in Section 1.2, I nd suggestive empirical evidence of
the model’s predictions about the protability of remaining entrepreneurs and the exit of
entrepreneurs in association with an increase in trade.
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Table 1.4: State Skill Premium, Skill Composition and Self Employ-




Exports/GDP -0.006 0.088* -0.063**
(0.013) (0.050) (0.024)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Cluster State State State
N Obs 350 350 350
This table shows the relationship between the changes exports and changes in the skill premium and
changes in relative high-skilled hours. Data source: IPUMS-USA, International Trade Administration,
Bureau of Economic Analysis. All variables dened in two year log dierences from 2002-2016.
1.6 Quantication
I now turn to the quantication of the model. First, I calibrate a three-country version of
the model, matching data from the US, China and the rest of the world (R.O.W.) prior to
China’s entry into the WTO. I then simulate China’s entry into the WTO and examine
the labor market eects. I then use this model to conduct counterfactual exercises on the
impact of skill-biased technological change, a reduction in education costs and a trade
war.
1.6.1 Calibration
I calibrate a three country version of my model for China, the US and R.O.W., matching
data to the base year of 1999, prior to China’s entry to the WTO. Following Burstein
and Vogel (2016), I take elasticity the elasticity of substitution across product varieties, σ,
and I select the degree of productivity bias, φ. I set the elasticity of substitution between
high- and low-skilled labor, ρ, to the consensus value reported in Giannone (2018), as the
value calibrated by Burstein and Vogel (2016) is low relative to the range reported in the
literature. Finally, to get the distribution of productivities, G(z), I follow Burstein and
Vogel (2016) and let the productivity draw of agent k given by zk = u−θk , where uk is
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the realization of a draw from the exponential distribution. For the distribution of ability,
F (a), I assume a Uniform [0, 1] distribution. A summary of values and sources is shown
in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Parameters from Literature
Parameter Value Denition Source/Target
σ 2.7 demand elasticity Burstein and Vogel (2016)
φ 1 degree of skill bias Burstein and Vogel (2016)
ρ 2.13 skill elasticity of substitution Giannone (2018)
θ 0.22 productivity shape parameter Burstein and Vogel (2016)
The remaining parameters are calibrated jointly. There are two parameters common
across countries: the shape of the probability of direct competition, λ, and skill share
parameter, α. There are two country-specic parameters for each country j: a common
productivity draw, Aj , and maximum schooling costs, cs,j . Finally, there are six bilateral
iceberg trade costs, τi,j , for a total of fourteen parameters. I match these to target moments
for the rate of entrepreneurship in the US, the US skill premium, GDP levels, the share of
high-skilled workers in each country and bilateral trade ows. Normalizing US GDP and
AUS , this leaves thirteen jointly calibrated parameters and thirteen moments.
Table 1.6: Target Moments and Model Values
Target Data Model
US Skill premium 1.98 2.01
US entrepreneurship rate 11% 14%
China to US GDP 0.11 0.11
R.O.W. to US GDP 1.76 1.75
% High-Skilled, US 29% 31.1%
% High- and Mid-Skilled, China 31% 32.2%
% High- or High/Mid-Skilled, R.O.W. 28% 28.8%
Export %, US 8% 8.5%
Export %, China 19% 19.1%
Export %, R.O.W. 7% 5.8%
Import %, US 10% 9.8%
Import %, China 14% 13.6%
Import %, R.O.W. 6% 5.4%
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Table 1.6 summarizes the target moments and their data and model values. For the
share of skilled hours, I group middle-skilled workers with the high-skilled workers for
skill scarce countries. As detailed in Appendix A.2, the results of my empirical analysis
are robust to this alternative grouping of high-skilled and middle-skilled workers. The so-
lution algorithm follows a nested loop structure that builds on Burstein and Vogel (2016)
and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Full details of the solution method are available in Ap-
pendix A.5.
1.6.2 China’s Entry into the WTO
To examine the quantitative relevance of the model’s mechanisms, I examine the impact of
China’s entry into the WTO on China’s market for skilled labor. To simulate this episode,
I estimate a symmetric reduction in China’s iceberg trade costs with the US and R.O.W., in-
creasing Chinese export share by roughly eleven percentage points, similar to the increase
observed from 2001 to 2004.9 I consider the impact of this shock on skill intensity and the
skill premium in three settings: without agent choice channels, with only the occupa-
tional choice channel and with both the occupational and educational choice channels
(all settings feature skill-biased productivity). The rst represents the implied short run
eect of trade on the market for skilled labor through only the skill-biased productivity
channel. The second represents the model-implied short run eect of trade, while the
third represents the model-implied long run eect. Table 1.7 summarizes the impact of
this trade liberalization.
Shutting down skill supply channels, the skill premium increases by 2.57%. While
Burstein and Vogel (2016) do not report coecient estimates for their counterfactual ex-
ercise, an eect of this magnitude is in line with their estimated country-level eects.
Activating the occupational choice channel and allowing entrepreneurs to exit increases
9China was admitted to the WTO in December, 2001. From 1995 to 2001, China’s export share uctuated
between 18% and 21%. Meanwhile, from 2001 to 2004, its export share grew from 20% to 31%.
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Table 1.7: China’s Entry to WTO
Occupational
Without Occupational and Educational
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
Skill premium (wh/w`) 2.57% 0.20% -4.27%
% High-skilled - 1.05% 3.01%
% Entrepreneurs - -1.21% -0.88%
Labor Share -1.80% -1.74% -1.67%
%Exports 12.2% 12.3% 12.1%
Changes in the skill premium and skill intensity in China after a reduction in trade barriers by skill sup-
ply adjustment channels: no adjustment, occupational adjustment only, occupational and educational
adjustment.
the relative supply of skilled labor. Adding the occupational choice channel, the share of
high-skilled workers increases by 1.05%. Comparing log changes in high- to low-skilled
labor and log changes in exports, I nd a short run ratio of 0.106, a little less than 60% of
the coecient on the relationship between trade and skill intensity in Column 5 of Table
1.1. In the model, this is sucient to almost eliminate the skill premium increases (0.20%),
in line with the short run ndings in the data.
Allowing agents to select their level of education increases educational attainment.
This is because of the additional prots earned by remaining entrepreneurs, as labor
share declines by 1.74%, despite a reduction in entrepreneurship when allowing for occu-
pational choice. Increased educational attainment further increases the supply of high-
skilled workers. Thus skill intensity goes up by 3.01%, while the skill premium goes down
by 4.27%. Again, converting to log changes in high- to low-skilled labor and log changes
in trade, this is an eect of 0.312, compared to a coecient of 0.346 estimated in Col-
umn 4 of Table 1.2. The reduction in the skill premium is large relative to the empirical
prediction, however, as I demonstrate in Section 1.6.4, the occupational choice channel no-
ticeably dampens this eect. Comparisons to the regression coecients are summarized
in Table 1.8.
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Table 1.8: Labor Market Responses to Trade
Model Implied Empirical
Coecient Coecient
∆ log(HS/LS hours), short run 0.106 0.184
∆ log(HS/LS wages), short run 0.005 -0.095
∆ log(HS/LS hours), long run 0.312 0.346
∆ log(HS/LS wages), long run -0.103 -0.019
Short run and long run impact of trade, model and data.
These results indicate the quantitative relevance of the skill-bias mechanism for in-
creasing demand for skilled labor and of the importance of occupational and educational
choice for increasing its supply. Without changes in skill supply, the skill premium in-
creases. Occupational choice can explains an increase in skill intensity rather than the
skill premium in the short run in association with increased trade. Increased educational
attainment in the long run further increases the share of high-skilled workers. It also
increases the mass of rms, increasing competition and demand for high-skilled labor. I
nd similar impacts on the US labor market (with lower levels as the eect on US trade is
smaller) as detailed in Appendix A.6.
Turning to examine the welfare implications of trade, I nd that factor reallocation
through the occupational and educational choice channel increases the total welfare gains
from trade relative to the baseline that ignores labor reallocation eects. Moreover, each
channel has substantially dierent allocation implications for low-skilled workers, high-
skilled workers and rms.
Table 1.9 examines the total welfare impact of trade with skill-biased productivity only,
adding occupational choice and adding educational choice. Total welfare increases when
adding occupational choice as a result of the fact that unlike in Column 1, where there is
no entrepreneurial exit, non-producing rms add to the labor force as the entrepreneurs
become high-skilled workers. This increases total production capacity, boosting total wel-
fare. Notice, however, that this change does little to benet low-skilled workers, who, de-
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Table 1.9: Welfare Impact of China’s Entry to WTO
Occupational
Without Occupational and Educational
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
Total Welfare 5.17% 6.67% 7.27%
Low-Skilled Workers 0.37% 0.38% 4.19%
High-Skilled Workers 2.97% 0.57% -0.26%
Average Entrepreneur 11.2% 25.8% 24.0%
Changes in welfare in China after a reduction in trade barriers by skill supply adjustment channels: no
adjustment, occupational adjustment only, occupational and educational adjustment.
spite their decreased factor abundance do not see their wages increase relative to the skill-
bias only case. Rather, the gains accrue almost entirely to the surviving entrepreneurs who
benet from the increase in high-skilled labor that keeps the skill premium low.
Adding in educational choice, on the other hand, is a boon to low-skilled workers.
They benet from two channels of factor reallocation. First, low skilled workers are more
scarce, boosting relative wages. Second, the mass of potential entrepreneurs increases,
increasing competition among rms, and lowering margins, increasing the welfare of all
workers. An increase in educational attainment further increases total welfare as the mass
of highly productive entrepreneurs increases. All told, the labor reallocation channels
increase the total welfare gains from trade by roughly 40%.
1.6.3 Skill-biased Technological Change
An alternate channel that may aect the skill premium is technological change. A uniform
shift in technology that increases the reliance on high-skilled labor is captured by an
increase in α. I examine the implications of an across the board shift in the reliance on
high-skilled labor through the mechanisms of the model.
As shown in Column 2 of Table 1.10, there is considerably less occupational switching
compared to the case of a trade liberalization. This results from a smaller increase in com-
petition, as fewer rms are able to expand into foreign markets as a result of this change
33
Table 1.10: Technological Change
Occupational
Without Occupational and Educational
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
Skill premium (wh/w`) 2.60% 2.02% 0.63%
% High-skilled - 0.15% 0.72%
% Entrepreneurs - -0.17% -0.08%
Labor Share -1.15% -0.02% 0.03%
%Exports 2.47% 0.21% 0.34%
Changes in the skill premium and skill intensity in China after an increase in α by skill supply ad-
justment channels: no adjustment, occupational adjustment only, occupational and educational adjust-
ment.
than from the reduction in trade barriers. Not surprisingly, the skill premium remains
high when allowing for occupational choice, at 2.02% rather than 2.60%. Nevertheless,
fewer agents shift their educational attainment as the share of prots accrued by rms
remains relatively stable.
These ndings indicate the importance of trade in inducing movement in the sup-
ply of skilled labor compared to a shift in demand for skilled labor from a technological
change. The critical dierence is trade’s role in increasing competition to the benet of
the most productive rms and the detriment of the least productive rms. This leads to
large changes in the decisions of educated agents, strongly aecting skill supply. Con-
versely, the eect of skill biased technological change is felt more uniformly across rms
resulting in less elastic skill supply, and leading to a general equilibrium increase in the
skill premium in the short run.
1.6.4 Reduction in Education Costs
Next, I examine the impact of a policy reducing education costs by 20% relative to the
calibrated baseline economy. This increases the share of educated agents, mechanically
increasing the share of high-skilled workers. I consider two cases: one in which the mass
of producing rms is xed and all additional educated agents become high-skilled work-
ers, and another in which newly educated agents may provide high-skilled labor. In ad-
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dition to examining the role of policy in mitigating inequality, this exercise isolates the
role of the interaction between occupational and educational choice channels following
an increase in the mass of educated agents.





% High-skilled 4.09% 3.14%
% Entrepreneurs - 0.61%
Labor Share -0.17% 0.18%
Export Percentage 1.20% -0.13%
This table shows changes in the skill premium and skill intensity following a 20% reduction in education
costs.
In both cases, the results in Table 1.11 show an increase in skill intensity and a de-
cline the skill premium declines. However, as shown in Column 2, the decline in the
skill premium is less severe when allowing occupational switching as some of the addi-
tional educated agents become entrepreneurs. This both decreases the mass of additional
high-skilled agents and increases the competition among entrepreneurs. As competition
increases, relative demand for high-skilled labor increases and entrepreneurial share de-
clines, despite an increase in the number of rms. This implies that, just as occupational
choice worked to transfer gains from high-skilled workers to surviving entrepreneurs in
the short run, occupational choice works to transfer some of the losses from high-skilled
workers to entrepreneurs in the long run.
A reduction in education costs is dierent from a worker retraining program in that
workers move up the global skill ladder rather than from one sector to another. This
exercise demonstrates the benet such a program may have for low-skilled workers. It
reduces the supply of low-skilled workers, increasing their relative wage. Moreover, it
directly increases the wage of those who are newly educated. Furthermore, it increases
market competition, reducing prices and boosting labor share.
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1.6.5 Trade War
Finally, I examine the potential consequences of a trade war resulting in a symmetric
20% increase in iceberg trade costs between all countries. Table 1.12 examines the impact
for the US of such a policy. While factor reallocation through the occupational choice
channel partially osets the standard welfare losses from trade, the educational choice
channel accelerates losses as decreases in educational attainment make the average rm
less productive.
Table 1.12: Welfare Impact of a Trade War
Occupational
Without Occupational and Educational
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
Total Welfare -4.89% -4.58% -4.78%
Low-Skilled Workers -4.67% -4.00% -4.28%
High-Skilled Workers -5.60% -3.21% -2.94%
Average Entrepreneur -4.62% -9.01% -8.86%
Changes in welfare in US after a 20% increase in iceberg trade costs by skill supply adjustment channels:
no adjustment, occupational adjustment only, occupational and educational adjustment.
Looking at the eect of a trade war on dierent types of workers, without factor ad-
justment, low-skilled workers gain slightly in relative terms, but are harmed like all other
types of workers. The occupational choice channel osets skill premium decreases in the
case of the trade war, just as they oset skill premium increases in the case of a trade
liberalization and results in lower welfare for the average entrepreneur as there is entry
among low-productivity entrepreneurs. Low-skilled workers are harmed in both absolute
and relative terms by the reduction in educational attainment as the factor of production
becomes more abundant and rms become less productive.
1.7 Conclusion
Understanding the relationship between trade and inequality requires understanding the
general equilibrium eects of trade on the relative demand and supply of skilled labor.
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Using recent cross country data, I present a puzzling empirical fact: trade is positively
associated with skill intensity, but not with the skill premium. This is true regardless of
initial skill abundance and for both short and long dierences. This is consistent with an
association between increases in trade and increases in both the demand and supply of
skilled labor.
To understand the relationship between trade, skill intensity and the skill premium, I
develop a tractable general equilibrium model of trade featuring skill-biased productivity,
and agents who make endogenous educational and occupational choices. Skill-bias pro-
ductivity captures the fact that trade liberalizations increase demand for skilled labor in all
countries regardless of skill-abundance. Educational choice captures long run increases
in the relative supply of skilled labor, while occupational choice captures the association
between trade and skill intensity rather than the skill premium in the short run. Though
the skill premium does not increase in the short run due to the occupational choice chan-
nel, increases in the prots of surviving rms induces additional educational attainment.
I calibrate this model and simulate China’s entry into the WTO, nding qualitative results
for labor market responses that are similar to the documented empirical facts. I nd that
including skill reallocation increases the welfare gains from trade by up to 40%. I also use
this model to conduct counterfactual exercises on the impact of skill-biased technological
change, nding it cannot explain the observed facts alone.
This paper has clear implications for the general equilibrium impact of trade on in-
equality. The endogenous response of agents’ supply of skilled labor substantially miti-
gates the impact of trade on the skill premium. In the short run, reductions in inequality
as measured by the skill premium mask the relative gains of educated agents to unedu-
cated agents through the gains to surviving rms. In the long run, increased educational
attainment reduces both the skill premium and the prots of entrepreneurs as competi-
tion increases. Counterfactual policy exercises show that reducing schooling costs can
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increase labor’s share and reduce inequality between educated and uneducated agents.
This suggests programs targeting broad-based education may be more eective at miti-
gating the inequality eects of trade than sector-specic retraining programs.
This paper suggests the importance of the role of agents for understanding the dy-
namics of competition and trade. Entrepreneurs, like workers, are agents who make an
occupational choice. Increasing direct and indirect competition among rms is benecial
to workers, but there is a tension in motivating educated agents to become entrepreneurs.
Similarly, the more broadly shared the are the gains of educational attainment, the less in-
dividual agents will be motivated to receive an education. As such, policy that reduces the
barriers to both educational attainment and entrepreneurship may act as a counterweight
to increase the gains from trade and ensure they are more widely shared.
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Chapter 2
What are the consequences of global banking
for the international transmission of shocks?
A quantitative analysis
Coauthored with José L. Fillat and Stefania Garetto
2.1 Introduction
The 2008 global nancial crisis and—more recently—the European sovereign debt crisis
have spurred debates among academics and policymakers about the regulation of large,
systemically important banks. Most of the institutions under scrutiny are multinational
banks, with operations in multiple countries, raising concerns about contagion and shock
transmission. Arguably, regulatory reforms should be not only reactive to crises, but also
designed ex-ante to reduce the likelihood and limit the severity of such crises.
In this paper, we inform the design of multinational banking regulation by developing
a quantitative structural model of global banking and by using it to evaluate the eects
of counterfactual policies. We focus our analysis on global banks because they are often
the largest players in the countries where they operate: as noted by (Goldberg, 2009), the
sheer size of foreign banking institutions and their involvement with the real economy
makes them important vehicles for the global transmission of shocks. For example, the
Japanese banking crisis in the early 1990s had a substantial eect on credit supply in the
United States, as many US branches and subsidiaries of Japanese banks shrank their US
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operations, and in some cases closed down, following the shock in their home country.
The European sovereign debt crisis also had rippling eects in the US credit markets,
mostly due to the fragility of foreign branches’ funding, as our empirical analysis shows
below. Several empirical studies have explored the role of multinational banks in the
transmission of shocks across countries.1 Our paper contributes to this literature in two
ways. First, while prior contributions have overlooked the importance of a bank’s mode
of operations, our model provides a microfoundation for the bank’s decision of whether
and how to enter a foreign market—through branches or subsidiaries. We nd that this
dierentiation is of rst-order importance to understanding the eects of nancial crises.
Second, while most of the existing work has been conducted using reduced-form analy-
sis, our quantitative model enables us to study the consequences of potential regulatory
changes via counterfactual analysis.
The model we develop is designed to describe the institutional details of the banking
industry and to be consistent with a number of stylized facts from US bank-level data.
For this reason, our analysis focuses on the two most prominent forms of foreign bank-
ing institutions in the United States: branches and subsidiaries. Current US bank regu-
lations treat foreign-owned branches and subsidiaries dierently, so the activities that a
branch and a subsidiary are allowed to undertake dier: for example, while subsidiaries
are separately capitalized, branches do not raise independent equity and are subject to
capital requirements at the parent bank level. While subsidiaries can issue all types of de-
posits, branches can issue only uninsured wholesale deposits. Finally, unlike subsidiaries,
branches can freely transfer funds to and from their parent.2
The distinction between branches and subsidiaries is important, both for the selection
of dierent banks in these two organizational modes, and for their dierent responses to
1See most notably (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 2012a, 2012b).
2In the remainder of this paper, as an analogy to the literature on multinational corporations, we refer
to a parent bank, or just parent, as the home-based banking organization. Branches are owned by a bank,
while subsidiaries may be owned by a bank or directly by a bank holding company.
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shocks. We show that the European parents of global banking conglomerates with ali-
ates in the United States tend to be larger than those European banks without operations
in the United States. Moreover, the parent banking organizations of foreign subsidiaries
are systematically larger than the parent banks of foreign branches. At the aliate level,
subsidiaries also are larger than branches. These size rankings hold when evaluated in
terms of deposits, loans, and total assets. To study the extent of shock transmission, we
analyze the response of US-based aliates of European banks to the European sovereign
debt crisis. We nd that, in the wake of the crisis, US branches of exposed European banks
experienced a ight in their uninsured deposits, while deposits at subsidiaries (both in-
sured and uninsured) grew. Because the shortage of funding that branches experienced
was only partially compensated by intrarm transfers of funds from their parents, US
branches of exposed European banks experienced a decrease in their assets. At the same
time, assets increased in exposed US subsidiaries. These facts inform the construction of
the model.
The bank’s problem is modeled as a monopolistically competitive extension of the
Monti-Klein model (see (Klein, 1971), and (Monti, 1972)), augmented to include institu-
tional features like capital requirements and deposit insurance. The model explicitly dis-
tinguishes among foreign banking institutions by their mode of operations, which is en-
dogenous and responds to dierences in the regulatory environment and in bank manage-
ment eciency. This feature allows us to assess whether the mode of operations matters
for the severity of shocks’ transmission across countries. The model features the chan-
nels of adjustment that we document in the data, and its simple structure is amenable to
quantication. We calibrate the model to match a set of cross-sectional moments of the
US foreign banking sector and show that our calibrated economy generates responses to
shocks that are consistent with the actual responses of multinational banks to the Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis. We then use the model to perform counterfactual exercises
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that shed light on the quantitative implications of current and counterfactual banking
regulations for the transmission of shocks across countries.
Our baseline quantitative exercise consists of an analysis of the European sovereign
debt crisis. In the model, the crisis is isomorphic to a sudden decline in the probability
of loan repayment in Europe. This decline reduces European banks’ prots and equity
accumulation, lowers their equity to risk-weighted assets ratio, and tightens the banks’
buer on capital requirements. To examine the eect of this change in the balance sheets
of European banks on the operations of their US-based aliates, we model deposit supply
following the empirical evidence reported in (Egan et al., 2017): on the one hand, a tight-
ening in global conglomerates’ capital reduces the supply of wholesale deposits, which
represents a funding shock for US branches. Faced with solvency problems in their for-
eign branches, European parents use their internal capital market to support protable
lending in their US branches. Nonetheless, US branches decrease their total assets. On
the other hand, foreign subsidiaries’ balance sheets are more isolated from the shock that
aects their parents. As a result, there is no direct eect on their assets and liabilities.
The model is conceptually simple, yet rich in its depiction of the regulatory framework.
Given its success at replicating the observed response of foreign banking organizations
(henceforth, FBOs) to the European sovereign debt crisis, we use the model to simulate the
response to the crisis under counterfactual policy scenarios. The results of our exercises
suggest that increased capital requirements, the elimination of branching, or an ad hoc
monetary policy intervention would have mitigated the negative eects of the crisis on
US aggregate lending. Conversely, the elimination of subsidiarization would have caused
an even more severe decline in banking activity in the United States.
Our model also has interesting implications about the possible response of FBOs to
“large” shocks to their parents. More precisely, frictions to the internal capital market
between parents and subsidiaries imply that, following a “large” shock, a parent bank
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may decide to repatriate funds by shutting down its foreign subsidiaries. The parents of
branches do not have the same incentives, as they can freely repatriate funds through
their internal capital market. As an external validation of this mechanism, we show that
subsidiaries are more likely than branches to exit a foreign market, and that exits are more
common in periods when the parents’ equity positions are declining.3
Taken together, the results illustrate the consequences that dierent organizational
forms have for the transmission of nancial shocks across countries. Subsidiarization iso-
lates a global bank’s balance sheets by location; hence, it minimizes cross-country conta-
gion. However, by not having access to a uid internal capital market within the conglom-
erate, subsidiaries do not provide an eective instrument to dampen the global eect of
shocks, resulting in possible reorganizations and exits.4 Conversely, parent-branch con-
glomerates can more easily take advantage of their internal capital market, smooth the
intensity of shocks across countries, and reduce their global impact.
This paper is related to a large empirical literature that studies the role of global banks
as vehicles of shock transmission across countries. In a seminal contribution, (Peek and
Rosengren, 2000) have shown the role that US-based branches of Japanese banks played
in transmitting the eect of the Japanese banking crisis to the United States. In a similar
spirit, (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011) document a decline in lending by foreign aliates
of global banks in emerging economies in the wake of the 2007–2009 nancial crisis. (Ce-
torelli and Goldberg, 2012a, 2012b) point to the internal capital markets of global banking
conglomerates as a channel that strongly contributed to spreading nancial shocks dur-
ing the 2007–2009 crisis. The possibility that parents and branches transfer funds across
borders but within the boundaries of the bank holding company is a feature of primary
importance in the framework that we present in this paper. Like (Ivashina et al., 2015), our
3Subsidiary exits are typically executed as asset sales to domestic banks, not necessarily as closures or
liquidations.
4Internal capital markets are not uid in that capital transfers from subsidiaries to their parents are
limited by capital requirements set by the subsidiary’s host-country regulator.
43
paper puts emphasis on the consequences of funding shocks for the lending behavior of
global banks. While (Ivashina et al., 2015) examine the eect of the European sovereign
debt crisis on US lending compared to Euro lending within global banks, our analysis
focuses on the eects on US lending across dierent types of global banks.
By presenting stylized facts about the features distinguishing multinational from non-
multinational banks, our analysis is also closely related to (Claessens et al., 2001) and
(Niepmann, 2018). Our structural model focuses on two alternative forms of foreign bank-
ing: branching and subsidiarization. In this dimension, our work is related to (Cerutti
et al., 2007), (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2010), (Fiechter et al., 2011), and (Danisewicz
et al., 2017). Some of the facts that we report, related to changes in foreign branches’ bal-
ance sheets in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis, are present also in (Correa
et al., 2016). We explicitly compare changes in branches’ balance sheets to changes in the
balance sheets of subsidiaries.
There is a small but growing literature that uses tools from international trade theory
to study the operations of multinational banks. The seminal paper by (Eaton, 1994) sets the
direction for structural research on this topic, but the rst contributions to this agenda are
in the pioneering work by (Niepmann, 2015; Niepmann, 2018). Our framework shares with
(Niepmann, 2018) the emphasis on within-country bank heterogeneity and on the role of
endogenous selection to understand aggregate outcomes in the global banking sector. The
role of bank heterogeneity is also prominent in (de Blas and Russ, 2013) and (Bremus et al.,
2013), which both show evidence of granularity in the banking sector. Finally, this paper
shares with (Corbae and D’Erasmo, 2013) the emphasis on using quantitative analysis to
understand features of the banking data.
There has been an increasing concern about the unintended cross-border eects of
policy actions, and global banks play an important role in the international transmission
of shocks. In an empirical analysis of the spillovers of national banking regulations across
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borders, (Berrospide et al., 2017) nd that tighter banking regulations shift lending away
from countries where the tightening occurs. In particular, subsidiaries and branches of
banks domiciled in the tightening country play an important role in the transmission
mechanism. A similar argument is made in (Ongena et al., 2018), who study the trans-
mission of US monetary policy across borders through the foreign lending operations of
multinational banks headquartered in the United States. We contribute to this literature
by examining the potential eects of alternative banking regulations in our quantitative
analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the data and
documents stylized facts about foreign banking institutions operating in the US market.
Section 2.3 develops a simple model that illustrates the decisions that multinational banks
face. The model is then calibrated and used to perform counterfactual exercises in Section
2.4. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Foreign Banks in the United States: Stylized Facts
2.2.1 Data
This analysis relies on bank-level data obtained from a variety of sources. Our main source
is the Quarterly Report of Condition and Income that every US bank is required to le (also
known as “Call Reports”). In addition to domestic banks, US-based subsidiaries of foreign
banks must ll out these reports as well.5 We also use the quarterly “Report of Assets and
Liabilities of US Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks” that every branch and agency
5The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) collects these data in two dierent
reporting forms: FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041. Banks with foreign oces must le the FFIEC 031 form and
banks with only domestic oces must le the FFIEC 041 form. The information about domestic operations
is identical across reports for all practical purposes. Appendix B.1 summarizes the US regulatory framework
and the changes it underwent in the past decades, with special focus on those regulations that had an impact
on foreign banks operating in the United States. Changes to these regulations do not aect the approach
and classication that we use in this paper.
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of a foreign bank is required to le.6 Call Reports data include detailed information about
a foreign bank’s US operations, and the ultimate owner’s identity, which allows us to
distinguish US-based entities belonging to foreign-owned global banks from US-owned
banks.
In order to have a full picture of global banks’ operations at home and abroad, we
merge the Call Reports data with two additional data sources. First, we obtain regulatory
reporting data and accounting data led by the foreign parents of US-based subsidiaries
and branches from S&P Global Market Intelligence. These data enable us to have a com-
plete picture of each bank’s activities in the headquarter country and in the US. Second, we
obtain reported sovereign debt holdings of European banks provided as part of the Euro-
pean Banking Authority’s (EBA) Stress Test information. The EBA started implementing
annual stress tests in 2009, but only disclosed bank sovereign holdings from 2011 on. Each
annual stress test is based on the banks’ portfolios as of the previous year. Therefore, we
use European banks’ portfolio holdings as of the last quarter of 2010.
As a result of this data merger, we obtain a sample of 56 European banks that are
the ultimate owners of US-based aliates. At the ultimate owner level, we consolidate
all the oces of the same type (i.e., all subsidiaries and all branches). These merged data
allow us to present evidence about the response to shocks by dierent entities of the same
global banking conglomerate that are located in dierent countries. Since the core of our
empirical analysis focuses on how global banks responded to the European sovereign debt
crisis, we restrict our sample period to 2007–2013.
2.2.2 The Cross-Section of Foreign Banks
Foreign institutions have a substantial presence in the US banking market. Of the aggre-
gate assets held by banks operating in the United States, between 15 and 20 percent belong
6Form FFIEC 002 is similar to the Call Reports, but it also contains the balances “due from” and “due to”
the head oce (parent) and related depository institutions, wherever located.
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to banking oces that are ultimately owned by a foreign parent. Foreign-owned banking
oces account for about 20 percent of total deposits and between 20 and 30 percent of
total commercial and industrial loans in the United States (see Figure B·1 in the Appendix
for more details).
What are the activities of FBOs in the United States? The answer is complex, as a
foreign bank may operate in the US market under dierent organizational forms, associ-
ated with very dierent activities and—most importantly—dierent regulations. A foreign
bank may open a subsidiary bank, which for most purposes operates as a domestically
owned US banking entity. A subsidiary is subject to US regulation, raises independent
equity, and is subject to independent capital requirements. A subsidiary may accept both
wholesale deposits and retail deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration (FDIC).7 Any capital ows between the subsidiary and the foreign parent must
happen “at arm’s length,” in the form of loans, equity injections, or capital distributions
(dividends). This means that if a foreign parent wants to transfer funds to or from a sub-
sidiary in the United States, there is no uid internal channel to do so.8 In our dataset,
we count 47 US-based subsidiaries of foreign banks, with total assets of approximately
$1.16tn, which represent 7.1 percent of all bank assets in the United States. Out of these
47 subsidiaries, 17 are ultimately owned by European banks, with total assets of $0.68tn
in the United States.
The other most common form of operations is via branching: a branch is also subject to
US regulations, but unlike a subsidiary does not raise independent equity. A branch is only
subject to capital requirements at the conglomerate level in its home country (i.e., branch
assets are consolidated with the foreign parent assets when evaluating the conglomerate’s
7Deposits in subsidiaries are classied as retail if they are under the FDIC threshold ($100,000 until 2005
and $250,000 thereafter). Wholesale deposits are those above the FDIC threshold.
8Equity injections are rare and subject to the home regulator. Equity ows to the parent are in the
form of dividend distributions, which are limited by earnings and are typically semiannual. Recently, these
distributions are even more limited by the performance in the stress testing exercise for those subsidiaries
with more than $50 billion in assets.
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capital ratio). Branches may make loans, but may only accept uninsured wholesale de-
posits.9 Unlike subsidiaries, branches have an intrarm channel to transfer capital ows
to/from the parent, and do display large intrarm capital ows with their foreign parents
(more on this below). In our dataset, there are 182 US-based branches of foreign banks,
with total assets of approximately $2.19tn, which represent 15 percent of all bank assets
in the United States. Out of these 182 US-based branches, 62 are ultimately owned by
European banks, with total assets of $1.19tn in the United States.
Subsidiaries and branches are the two most common ways that foreign banks operate
in the US banking system. Taken together, subsidiaries and branches represent more than
99 percent of the assets held by foreign-owned banking oces. In terms of business lines,
these two forms of entry also entail activities that are close to those of traditional banks.10
Our description of the foreign banking sector in the United States begins by showing
that there is selection by size akin to what is observed for multinational rms operating
in nonbanking sectors. Figure 2·1 compares European parents of US-based FBOs and Eu-
ropean banks without US operations in terms of loans, deposits, and overall assets.11 It
is evident that the European banks that enter the US market through aliates are larger
than the ones that do not.12 (Niepmann, 2018) presents evidence of a similar pecking order
9Branches do not have their own balance sheet, as it is consolidated into the balance sheet of the parent
institution. Branches do not have a capital account, and are not required to report income statement vari-
ables. Nonetheless, the US regulatory framework requires foreign-owned branches and agencies to report
their assets and liabilities in the FFIEC 002 form.
10In addition to branches and subsidiaries, the data display two more types of organizations. Edge and
agreement corporations cannot engage in business in the United States with US-based entities and are pre-
cluded from making domestic loans or accepting domestic deposits. Representative oces and nondepository
trusts do not accept deposits or give loans, and their asset holdings are negligible compared with the other
types of foreign entities. Given their small weight in aggregate banking activities, we drop edge and agree-
ment corporations, representative oces, and nondepository trusts from our sample and focus the analysis
on foreign-owned branches and subsidiaries.
11The assets side of a bank’s balance sheet includes many types of loans: wholesale (commercial and
industrial loans, real estate loans, and loans to other nancial institutions) and retail (mortgages, home
equity, auto loans, and credit cards). In addition, other assets held by banks are securities (US treasuries,
residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, other asset-backed securities, and a small amount
of stocks) and trading assets. The liabilities side includes deposits, short-term and long-term debt, and
owners’ equity.
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Figure 2·1: Foreign Parents versus ForeignNonmultinational Banks
Comparison of size measures of foreign parents of US-based FBOs (sub-
sidiaries and branches) versus European banks without US operations.
Data are in trillions of US dollars.
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence data for top-tier parents of US
branches and subsidiaries from Europe.
based on bank eciency (computed as the ratio of overhead costs to total assets). Multina-
tional banks appear to be systematically more ecient than nonmultinational banks. The
model that we present in the next section features a positive relationship between bank
eciency and bank size, consistent with Figure 2·1. The gure further distinguishes par-
ents of foreign subsidiaries from parents of foreign branches, and shows that the parents
of foreign subsidiaries are on average larger banks compared with the parents of foreign
branches.
At the aliate level, there are large size dierences between subsidiaries and branches
FBOs and foreign banks without operations abroad. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to
distinguish foreign nonmultinational banks from foreign parents of FBOs located in countries other than
the United States. However, we argue that since the United States is one of the most popular markets for the
activities of multinational banks, if foreign banks do not have US operations, it is unlikely that they have
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Figure 2·2: US-Based Branches versus US-Based Subsidiaries of For-
eign Banks
Comparison of size measures of US-based subsidiaries and branches of
FBOs. Data are in billions of US dollars.
Source: US Structure Data for US Oces of Foreign Banking Organiza-
tions - Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestic and Foreign-Owned US
Commercial Banks plus US Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.
of FBOs. Figure 2·2 reports the average size of deposits, loans, and overall assets held
by a US branch or subsidiary of a European bank. When comparing FBOs, the average
subsidiary is substantially larger than the average branch in terms of deposits, loans, and
overall assets. Size dierences are persistent over the sample period, and are not driven
by a few rms with extraordinarily large balance sheets: the deposits, loans, and assets
size distributions of foreign subsidiaries rst-order stochastically dominate the analogous
distributions of foreign branches (see Figure B·2 in the Appendix).
Finally, Figure B·3 in the Appendix shows that the amount of assets foreign banks hold
in the United States is positively related to their domestic size, indicating that banks that
are “big” in their home country also have large foreign operations. This fact motivates an
important assumption of the model: that banks transfer their eciency to their foreign
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aliates.
2.2.3 Foreign Banks’ Response to Shocks
We use the European sovereign debt crisis as a natural experiment to analyze how global
banks respond to shocks and the extent to which these institutions transmit shocks across
countries. In particular, we analyze the dierential eects on banks’ balance sheets due
to dierences across bank portfolio holdings of sovereign debt from Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS). The analysis in this section is similar in spirit to the one in
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012b) and (Correa et al., 2016), but with an emphasis on the
distinction between foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches operating in the United
States. In a nutshell, we nd that after the European sovereign debt crisis: 1) US-based
branches of exposed European banks reduced their assets in the United States while US-
based subsidiaries of exposed European banks did not experience a decline in assets; 2)
the probability that a US branch received an intrarm transfer from an exposed parent
increased, and the amount of the transfer increased; and 3) there was a ight of uninsured
wholesale deposits from the US branches of exposed European parents, while both the
insured and uninsured deposits of US subsidiaries of exposed European parents were not
aected.
We start by assessing the dierential response of branches versus subsidiaries by look-
ing at their assets. For this purpose, we run the following regression:
aeb,t = α + β1Crisist + β2Expb + β3Crisist × Expb + δc + εeb,t, (2.1)
where aeb,t is the natural log of total assets of entity e belonging to bank b at time t. An en-
tity is either an aggregate of US-based branches or an aggregate of US-based subsidiaries
belonging to a European banking conglomerate b. We run the regression separately for
branches and for subsidiaries. The dummy variable Crisist takes the value of 1 for all
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quarter-years after Q1-2011 (included), while the dummy variable Expb takes the value of
1 when parent bank b of entity e is exposed to GIIPS sovereign debt as of December 2010.
We classify a bank as exposed if it has GIIPS sovereign debt holdings above the sample
median.13 The regression includes parent country xed eects, denoted by δc, to exploit
variation in asset holdings across banks from the same host country. The results are re-
ported in Table 2.1 and show that, after the European sovereign debt crisis, US branches
of exposed European banks decreased their assets in the United States, while the assets of
US subsidiaries of exposed European banks were unaected.14 The estimated coecients
in the second column of table 2.1 imply that assets held in branches owned by exposed
parents experienced a 54 percent decline on average—about $500 billion in total, after the
crisis. The average decline is comparable to that in (Peek and Rosengren, 2000), where
they estimate the eects of the Japanese crises in the early 1990s. (Peek and Rosengren,
2000) nd that assets held by Japanese branches in California, New York, and Illinois, de-
clined by 53 percent, 50 percent, and 70 percent, respectively, with a total asset contraction
of $42 billion in 2013 dollars.15
There is some concern that the exposure to GIIPS sovereign debt is not predetermined.
The exact timing of the European sovereign debt crisis played out over a longer stretch
than is captured by our annual data frequency, that is, banks may have started to adjust
13The chain of events in 2010 resulted in a fear of contagion regarding sovereign default in the GIIPS
countries which, at the same time, fueled concerns about the stability of the euro and the euro zone more
broadly. As Appendix Figure B·6 illustrates, exposed banks were headquartered in many countries in Eu-
rope, not only the GIIPS. ur results are robust to alternative denitions of exposed banks. In particular, we
also performed the empirical analysis reported in this section using the following alternative denitions of
“exposed parent”: i) classify a bank as exposed if it has positive GIIPS sovereign debt holdings, ii) classify a
bank as exposed if from a country in the euro zone. We dene exposure using these coarse dummies rather
than using exposure levels as explanatory variables because GIIPS sovereign debt holdings constitute a very
small share of these banks’ balance sheets: among exposed parents, the mean (median) exposure is only 3.07
percent (1.7 percent) of assets. For this reason, we do not think that variation in the intensive margin of
exposure drives the dierent responses of banks to the crisis.
14For robustness, we also run the regression pooling observations of branches and subsidiaries, identify-
ing dierential responses to the crisis via triple interaction terms. The results are unchanged. We prefer to
present the results of the two separate regressions to ease the interpretation of the coecients of interest.
15Their original estimate is $28.3 billion in 1996 dollars.
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Crisis× Exp 0.0847 –0.622∗∗
(0.234) (0.231)
Country FE Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 914 2,683
R2 0.585 0.288
their sovereign holdings before December 2010. While the results in Table 2.1 should be
interpreted as describing a correlation between banks’ GIIPS exposure and assets, we also
notice that possible banks’ reductions in their sovereign debt holdings prior to 2010 would
make our results weaker.
Given that the sovereign debt crisis aected the balance sheets of the European par-
ents of these FBOs, one might think that the drop in assets of their US-based branches was
associated with an internal transfer of resources from the United States to Europe. The
left panel of Figure 2·3 shows the evolution of the aggregate net ows to and from related
institutions. From 1995 to 2011, the amounts that European parent banks were borrowing
from their US branches were much larger than the amounts that US branches were bor-
rowing from their European parents. This pattern is consistent with the evidence shown
by (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012a, 2012b) and (Correa et al., 2016) about foreign branches
being a source of funding to their US parents. The pattern sharply reverts at the onset of
the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. The right panel of Figure 2·3 illustrates the
intrarm ows broken down between exposed and nonexposed banks. It is evident from
the gure that the sign reversal in intrarm capital ows between parents and branches
is mostly due to FBOs whose parents were exposed to the crisis.16




























?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??????
??????? ??????????
Figure 2·3: Net Intrarm Flows for Foreign Branches of European
Banks
The plot shows the dierence between net due from related depository in-
stitutions and net due to related depository institutions (items 2 and 5, re-
spectively, from the “Schedule RAL - Assets and Liabilities”). Data are in
billions of US dollars.
Source: Report of Assets and Liabilities of US Branches and Agencies of
Foreign Banks (FFIEC 002).
We run the following regressions to establish more precisely the sharp distinction
between intrarm ows of exposed versus nonexposed European banks with foreign
branches:
T eb,t = α + β1Crisist + β2Expb + β3Crisist × Expb + δc + εeb,t. (2.2)
To study both the intensive and extensive margin of the intrarm transfers, Te,b,t is
either a dummy variable taking the value one if parent bank b has a claim on branch e’s
assets in period t (zero if the branch has a claim on the parent), or the size of the intrarm
transfer of parent bank b to branch e at time t. The other variables have been dened
above.
The results are reported in Table 2.2, and show that at the onset of the European
sovereign debt crisis, both the intensive and the extensive margin of the intrarm transfer
between a European parent and its US branches were aected as long as the parent was
exposed to GIIPS debt. The probability that a US branch received an intrarm transfer
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Table 2.2: Intensive and Extensive Margin of Intrarm Transfers
between European Parents and their US Branches









Country FE No Yes
No. of Obs. 3,000 2,976
R2 0.0333 0.176
from the exposed parent increased, and the amount of the transfer also increased.
So far we have documented a drop in assets for US branches accompanied by a trans-
fer of resources from the already-exposed European parents to their branches. To shed
light on this apparent puzzle, we examine the funding side of US FBOs’ balance sheets
by running regressions of deposits on a set of dummies that are analogous to the ones
previously used:
deb,t = α + β1Crisist + β2Expb + β3Crisist × Expb + δc + εei,t, (2.3)
where dei,t is the natural log of total deposits of entity e at time t. We run three separate
regressions: one for retail insured deposits, which are accepted only by subsidiaries, one
for wholesale uninsured deposits held by subsidiaries, and one for wholesale uninsured
deposits held by branches.
The results are shown in Table 2.3. Retail deposits in exposed subsidiaries appear to
be unaected by the crisis. More interestingly, the ight in wholesale deposits that other
papers have documented appears to be unique to branches owned by exposed European
parents. On the contrary, wholesale deposits increased in US subsidiaries owned by ex-
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Table 2.3: Intensive Margin of Wholesale and Retail Deposits;
Branches vs. Subsidiaries
Subsidiaries Branches
ln(Retail Deposits) ln(Wholesale Deposits) ln(Wholesale Deposits)
Crisis 0.403∗∗∗ 0.000503 0.106
(0.154) (0.138) (0.241)
Exp 1.740∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 2.323∗∗∗
(0.469) (0.421) (0.309)
Crisis× Exp 0.480 0.189 –1.340∗∗∗
(0.312) (0.283) (0.346)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 914 906 2,382
R2 0.454 0.463 0.244
posed European parents. Other papers17 have documented the ight of wholesale deposits
during the European sovereign debt crisis, but did not highlight the dierent responses
depending on the organizational form of the banks accepting them. Table 2.3 suggests
that the ight aected only those wholesale deposits that were held in branches, indi-
cating that this less-regulated organizational form was perceived as less stable by large
wholesale depositors.
The results of this analysis depict a scenario in which distress among some European
parents was associated with a ight of uninsured deposits from their foreign branches
in the United States. The reaction on the funding side of foreign branches has the ef-
fect of changing the direction of intrarm banking ows: foreign branches appeared to
be a source of funding to their parents until 2011, while after the crisis parents started
acting as a source of funding to their branches. This evidence indicates that branching
appears to transmit shocks across countries more than subsidiarization does, as the latter
institutional arrangement eectively isolates FBOs from potential distress aecting their
parents.
In the next section we introduce a structural model of foreign banking that is consis-
tent with the institutional features of the foreign banking sector in the United States and
17See (Correa et al., 2016); (Egan et al., 2017).
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with the empirical evidence presented so far in this paper.
2.3 A Model of Foreign Banking
This section introduces a simple model that illustrates the main tradeos that a bank faces
when deciding whether and how to operate in a foreign country. We extend the Monti-
Klein model (see (Klein, 1971), and (Monti, 1972)) to a setting with monopolistic compe-
tition among heterogeneous banks, featuring the institutional characteristics of dierent
bank types. The model enables us to understand banks’ decisions as responses to various
shocks and the consequences of these choices for the banking sector in aggregate, and
lays the ground for the quantitative analysis developed in the next section.
2.3.1 Setup
The model economy is composed of two countries, Home and Foreign. Variables referring
to the Foreign country are denoted by an asterisk (∗). Each country is populated by a large
mass of banks. In addition, each bank may open an aliate in the other country, either as
a branch or as a subsidiary, and thus become the parent of a multinational bank.
In order to examine the eect of shocks like the European sovereign debt crisis, we
develop the model with two periods. In the rst period, each bank chooses whether and
how to operate in the foreign market, makes prots, and accumulates equity. We label
a “local bank” as a bank that chooses not to operate in the foreign market. At the end
of the rst period, an unexpected shock hits the economy, aecting equity accumulation
and the decisions banks make in the second period.
We start by modeling the prot maximization problem of a bank conditional on each
one of the three international status choices: local bank, parent with foreign subsidiary,
or parent with foreign branch. Once the tradeos driving a bank’s optimal decisions con-
ditional on its status are well understood, we model selection into international status.
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A bank enters the foreign market if, by doing so, it will make higher prots than if it
operated only domestically.
In the domestic market, each bank oers one-period loans (L). With a certain prob-
ability of default (1 − p) loans are delinquent and the principal is not repaid. Each bank
also accepts deposits (D), and borrows/lends in the interbank market (M ). We assume
that every bank has market power in the market for loans, originating from some type
of dierentiation (e.g., spatial or product). This dierentiation, together with customers’
love of variety in banking products, is the rationale for why many banks coexist in the
economy. Banks are heterogeneous in the eciency with which they manage their activi-
ties, and operate under monopolistic competition in the market for loans and deposits. For
simplicity, the interbank market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. We do not model
domestic entry: all banks operate and make nonnegative prots in their home market.
During each period, banks incur a cost to manage deposits and loans described by
the cost function a · C(D,L). The bank-specic eciency parameter a is the source of
heterogeneity across banks, and it aects the management cost function multiplicatively,
so that “low a” banks are more ecient than “high a” banks. Moreover, each bank is
endowed with a given amount of equity E(a), which is a function of bank eciency.
In order to assess the importance of regulatory banking policies for the response to
shocks, we model deposit insurance and capital requirements. In the United States, for
example, all banks accepting retail deposits have to pay deposit insurance to the FDIC,
which determines the deposit insurance premium (IP ), or assessment, on a risk basis. A
bank’s assessment is calculated by multiplying its assessment rate by its assessment base,
where a bank’s assessment base is equal to its average consolidated total assets minus its
average tangible equity. In our model, the assessment rate is a function expressing the
bank’s ability to withstand funding and asset stress, so we assume the assessment rate is
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a function of the bank’s equity and liabilities:
IP (D,L,M) = fp(D,M
−, E(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
assessment rate
· (L+M+ − E(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
assessment base
, (2.4)
where M+ (M−) denotes interbank lending (borrowing).18
Banks are subject to capital requirements every period, i.e., there is a lower bound on




where the value of k is set in the United States under the implementation of the Basel
II/Basel III Accords. The parameters ωL and ωM are appropriate weights that reect the
riskiness of a bank’s loans and investments, and are determined by the regulatory agen-
cies (in the US case, by the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Oce of the Comptroller of the
Currency).
Based on the evidence presented in Section 2.2, we assume that when a bank enters
the Foreign market, it transfers its eciency 1/a to the new aliate. Entering the Foreign
market involves a xed cost, that is higher if the bank enters with a subsidiary rather
than a branch: Fs > Fb > 0. The xed costs of opening a subsidiary may include the
cost of setting up a network of aliates, acquiring customers, and learning about the host
country’s regulatory framework. As the activities of branches are more limited compared
to those of subsidiaries, we assume that the xed cost of branching is lower than the xed
cost of subsidiarization. If a bank enters the Foreign market as a subsidiary, the subsidiary
performs exactly the same operations as the parent does in the Home country: it accepts
retail deposits, issues loans, makes investments, borrows/lends in the interbank market,
holds independent equity, and it is subject to its own capital requirements. We also assume
that the subsidiary faces operating costs analogous to the ones of the parent.
18Appendix B.4 contains more institutional details about the calculation of deposit insurance assessments.
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Conversely, if a bank enters the Foreign market by opening a branch, the activities
of the aliate dier from those of the parent. Branches do not raise independent equity,
they are not subject to capital requirements, and can only accept uninsured wholesale
deposits. Following (Egan et al., 2017), we assume that the supply of uninsured deposits is
less elastic than the supply of insured deposits, and that uninsured deposits are sensitive
to a measure of “distress” experienced by the banking corporation, while insured deposits
are not similarly aected.
Finally, there exists an intrarm channel linking the assets and liabilities of the parent
and its branch: parents of foreign branches can borrow from or lend to their branches
at no cost. Conversely, since transfers between parents and subsidiaries present more
frictions, we assume that parents and their subsidiaries can trade only at arm’s length via
the interbank market.
2.3.2 Local Banks
A local bank chooses the optimal amounts of loans, L, interbank activity,M , and deposits,
D, to maximize its prots:
max
L,D,M
p · rL(L) · L− (1− p)L+ rMM − rD(D) ·D − aC(D,L)− IP (D,L,M)
(2.6)
s.t. E(a) +D ≥ L+M (resource constraint)
E(a)
ωLL+ ωMM+
≥ k (capital requirement),
where rL(L), denotes a downward-sloping demand for loans, and p ∈ (0, 1) is the prob-
ability of loan repayment. The function rD(D) is an upward-sloping supply of insured
retail deposits,19 while rM is the interbank rate, which the bank takes as exogenous, but
19In the data, parent banks and their subsidiaries can accept all kinds of deposits, both wholesale and
retail. For simplicity, in the model we assume that parent banks and subsidiaries hold only retail deposits.
The results are robust to the removal of this simplifying assumption.
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is endogenously determined in industry equilibrium. Each bank maximizes the prots
generated by its activities subject to two constraints. First, its assets must not exceed its
liabilities (the resource constraint). Second, the ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets
must be maintained above the capital requirement, k. Notice also that the bank’s man-
agement cost and its equity level depend on the bank’s eciency, which is the exogenous
source of heterogeneity in the model.
In normal times, we observe in the data that banks choose to operate with a buer on
their capital requirements, i.e., capital requirement constraints are normally not binding.20
For this reason, we assume that the equilibrium in normal times is one where the resource
constraint binds, but the capital requirement does not. We refer to this solution of the
model as the “unconstrained equilibrium.” The unconstrained equilibrium is characterized



























where the functions’ arguments have been omitted to simplify the notation. The resource
constraint pins down interbank activity: M = E(a) +D − L.
The rst-order conditions are intuitive. A bank chooses the optimal amount of loans
such that the marginal revenue from lending is equal to the sum of the marginal costs of
loans and deposit insurance, the expected marginal loss from delinquent loans, and the
opportunity cost of forgone alternatives, namely lending to other nancial institutions in
the interbank market. Similarly, optimal deposits are set such that their “total” marginal
cost, inclusive of management costs and the insurance premium, is equal to the marginal
cost of borrowing in the interbank market. In Appendix B.4, we illustrate that by making
20Figure B·7 in the Appendix shows that banks in our sample have ratios of equity to risk-weighted assets
well above the capital requirements set by the regulators.
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some simple parametric assumptions, a bank’s maximal prot is an increasing function
of the bank’s eciency, 1/a, and the bank’s equity, E(a).
In the model, shocks to the economy may induce situations where the capital con-
straint of a local bank is binding. We refer to this scenario as the model’s “constrained
equilibrium” and present its detailed solution in Appendix B.4.
2.3.3 The Parent-Subsidiary Pair
Given that foreign-owned subsidiaries are de facto US banks, a parent-subsidiary pair
solves virtually the same prot maximization problem that a local bank faces in each
market in which it operates, albeit with two dierences: rst, upon establishing the sub-
sidiary, the parent transfers a share of its equity, sEE(a), in order for the subsidiary to
be initially capitalized. Subsequently, the two entities accumulate equity independently.





prL(L) · L− (1− p)L+ rMM − rD(D) ·D − aC(D,L)− IP (D,L,M) + ...
p∗r∗L(L
∗) · L∗ − (1− p∗)L∗ + rMM∗ − r∗D(D∗)D∗ − aC(D∗, L∗)− ...
IP (D∗, L∗,M∗)− FS (2.7)
s.t. (1− sE)E(a) +D ≥ L+M
sEE(a) +D







where asterisks denote foreign-market variables. Notice that all markets are segmented,
except for the interbank market, which is a frictionless international market, clearing at
the rate rM . We also assume that the deposit insurance premium, the capital requirement,
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and the risk weights on assets are symmetric across countries.
Given that the country-level prot functions associated with the two entities forming
the pair are identical, the equilibrium for each entity of a parent-subsidiary pair takes the
same form as the equilibrium for a local bank, with the appropriate equity levels, both in
the unconstrained and in the constrained case.
2.3.4 The Parent-Branch Pair
When a parent bank enters the Foreign market with a branch, the possibility of intrarm
transfers between parent and branch and the conglomerate’s aggregate capital require-




prL(L) · L− (1− p)L+ rMM − rD(D) ·D − aC(D,L)− IP (D,L,M) + ...
p∗r∗L∗(L










s.t. E(a) +D ≥ L+M + T
D∗w + T ≥ L∗
E(a)
ωL(L+ L∗) + ωMM+
≥ k,
where FB > 0 is the xed cost of operating a foreign branch, and T is the intrarm
transfer between the two entities (T > 0 when the parent is lending to the branch).
The prot function reects the institutional restrictions that make branches dier-
ent from local banks and subsidiaries. First, the balance sheet of a branch is eectively
“merged” with that of its parent: branches do not raise independent equity, do not oper-
ate independently in the interbank market,21 and can transfer funds to/from the parent at
21All interbank activity M is managed by the parent.
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no cost (T ). As a result, if a branch has excess funds, it may transfer these funds to the
parent to nance its domestic lending (as it appears in the pre-crisis period). Similarly, a
parent can fund its branch in the event of a shortage of deposits (as it appears in the post-
crisis period). Second, the lack of independent equity requirements for branches implies
that they are subject to capital requirements only at the level of the entire conglomer-








is the supply of wholesale deposits, where RWA denotes
risk-weighted assets: RWA = ωL(L+ L∗) + ωMM+.
We rely on the estimates by (Egan et al., 2017) and assume that the demand for unin-
sured wholesale deposits is less elastic than the demand for insured retail deposits, and
that wholesale deposits are sensitive to some measure of “distress” experienced by the
banking organization. Our model-based measure of distress is inversely related to the
buer in the capital requirement that banks hold in normal times, given by the ratio
of equity to risk-weighted assets (RWA) divided by the capital requirement k. When
E(a)
k·RWA = 1, the capital requirement is binding and the bank experiences maximum dis-
tress, resulting in a ight of wholesale deposits. Distress decreases as E(a)
k·RWA grows bigger
than one. This specication is also consistent with (Ivashina et al., 2015), who conclude
that wholesale funding is [quote]"sensitive to changing perceptions of a bank’s creditwor-
thiness
2.3.5 Industry Equilibrium and Equity Accumulation
Each country is populated by a continuum of banks that draw their bank-specic e-
ciency, 1/a, from the exogenous distributions F (a) and F ∗(a). Selection into the Foreign
market implies that there are endogenous equilibrium distributions of banks operating in
each country, which we denote with G(a), G∗(a).
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The interest rate in the interbank market is given by the market-clearing condition:∫
M(a; rM)G(a)da+
∫
M∗(a; rM)G∗(a)da = 0. (2.9)
Each bank starts the rst period with a given level of equity, E(a), and accumulates
equity over time through reinvested prots:
E ′(a) = E(a) + pi(a), (2.10)
where E ′(a) denotes equity in the second period. Finally, banks exit the market if they
reach negative equity: if E ′(a) < 0 for a local bank or for the parent of a conglomerate,
then the entire bank shuts down, while if E ′(a) < 0 for a subsidiary, only the subsidiary
shuts down.
2.3.6 Selection: Matching Cross-Sectional Facts
The simple model developed in this section is a useful tool to understand the tradeos
that banks face when entering foreign markets. The combination of bank-level eciency
with xed and variable costs of operation delivers selection of individual banks into the
three possible types: local banks, parent and subsidiary pairs, or parent and branch pairs.
Notice that in the model, branching and subsidiarization are alternative choices; hence,
no bank chooses both options to operate in a foreign market. This result is consistent with
most of the observations in our sample. Among the 47 European banks in our sample, 37
operate in the US market exclusively with branches or exclusively with subsidiaries. Six
of the remaining banks adopt both options, but have more than 70 percent of their assets
in one organizational form.
The xed costs associated with foreign operations imply that the largest and most e-
cient banks become multinational banks, which is consistent with what we observe in the
data (see Figure 2·1) and with the features of multinational corporations in other sectors
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(see ()bejesc09). For the model to generate selection by size across the dierent organi-
zational modes of multinational banking, there needs to be a tradeo between the xed
versus variable costs of branching compared to subsidiarization. Particularly, one ob-
tains the observed selection of the most (least) ecient global banks into subsidiarization
(branching) if subsidiarization, compared to branching, is associated with lower variable
costs but higher xed costs, as illustrated in Figure 2·4.














Figure 2·4: Selection by Eciency/Size into International and Orga-
nizational Status
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Dierences in eciency then directly translate into dierences in the size of deposits,
loans, and assets, so that more ecient banks issue more loans, accept more deposits, and
have more assets than less ecient banks. By including the relative sizes of dierent bank
types as target moments of our calibration, we ensure that the model generates the same
selection pattern that we observe in the data: foreign subsidiaries are larger than foreign
branches in terms of loans, deposits, and overall assets.
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2.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantify the model in order to use it for counterfactual analysis. We
start by calibrating the model to be consistent with the cross-sectional stylized facts pre-
sented in Section 2.2. The calibrated model is able to reproduce the dierential response of
global banks with dierent organizational structures to the shock we studied empirically,
the European sovereign debt crisis. To answer a set of policy-relevant questions, we per-
form a series of counterfactual exercises that shed light on the strength and weaknesses
of the current US regulatory framework.
2.4.1 Calibration
Our calibration exercise proceeds in three steps. First, a subset of the model’s parameters
can be directly matched to empirical observations or to previous studies. Second, we use
the empirical distribution of loans to discipline the parameters of the banks’ eciency and
equity distributions. Third, we use the model to jointly calibrate the remaining parameters
by matching some moments of interest. Since we want to calibrate the economy prior to
the European sovereign debt crisis, all the data moments of interest are for the year 2010.
We parameterize the model to preserve tractability and make possible the identica-
tion of key parameters. We assume a constant elasticity loan demand function: L(rL) =
r−εL A, where ε > 1 is the elasticity of loan demand, and A is a parameter describing the
aggregate size of the loan market. Similarly, we assume a constant-elasticity retail deposit
supply function: D(rD) = rϑDB, where ϑ > 0 is the elasticity of retail deposit supply, and
B is a parameter describing the aggregate size of the retail deposit market. For wholesale
deposits, this specication is augmented to generate responses to a measure of the bank-





Bw, where ϑw < ϑ is the
elasticity of wholesale deposits, and Bw is a parameter describing the aggregate size of
the wholesale deposit market. This functional form implies that the quantity of deposits
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supplied decreases as the buer on the capital requirement decreases, and that there is a
complete deposit ight (Dw = 0) when the capital requirement is binding. We assume that
the management cost function is linear: C(D,L) = cLL + cDD, where cL, cD > 0, and
postulate a parametric form for the deposit insurance assessment, which broadly follows
the FDIC Current Assessment Rate Calculator for Highly Complex Institutions:22
IP (D,L,M) =
[




· (L+M+ − E(a)). (2.11)
We directly calibrate the parameters p, Rmin, fp, k, ωL, ωM , ϑ, ϑw, and sE . In our
model, one minus the probability of loan repayment is equivalent to the bank’s expected
loss per dollar, which is equal to the probability of default multiplied by the loss given
default (one minus the recovery rate). The recovery rate is calibrated to a standard value
of 40 percent. In normal times, we calibrate the probability of default to a baseline value
of 2.5 percent.23 Hence we set the probability of loan repayment (in normal times) to 1
0.025 × 0.6 = 0.99.
Consistent with the assessment rates reported in Table B.2 in the Appendix, we set
Rmin = 0.025 percent to match the minimum possible assessment rate in the scenario
in which the bank lends in the interbank market (M > 0), while fp = 0.0224 percent is
set such that the bank will be assessed the maximum possible rate if its capital constraint
binds and if it relies on the money markets for 95 percent or more of its funding.
We set the capital requirement to k = 0.045, which is the Basel III capital requirement
for common equity over risk-weighted assets. The Basel II/Basel III regulation also gives
guidelines on the weights used to compute risk-weighted assets: we choose ωL = 0.5,
based on corporate loans, consumer loans, and residential mortgage exposures, and ωM =
0.1, based on risk weights for exposures to US depository institutions and credit unions.
22Appendix B.4 contains more details about these parametric choices.
23This is an approximate middle-range measure based on estimated probabil-
ities of default on debt with credit ratings ranging from AAA to BB. Source:
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/sta_reports/sr190.pdf.
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Table 2.4: Direct Calibration
Parameter Denition Value Source
p Probability of Loan Repayment 0.99 World Bank
Rmin, fp Insurance Premium Parameters 0.00025,0.000224 FDIC
k Capital Requirement 0.045 Basel II/III
ωL, ωM Risk Weights 0.5, 0.1 Basel II/III
sE Subsidiary’s Equity Share 0.11 Call Reports
2*ϑ, ϑw Elasticities of Retail and 2*0.56, 0.16 2*(Egan et al., 2017)
Wholesale Deposit Supply
(Egan et al., 2017) provide structural estimates of the elasticity of supply for both the
retail and wholesale deposit market in the United States. Since the way in which we model
deposit supply is a special parametric form of what they estimate, we use their estimated
elasticities and set ϑ = 0.56 and ϑw = 0.16.
Finally, in our dataset, a subsidiary’s equity is on average 11 percent of the equity of
the parent. As such, we set sE = 0.11. Table 2.4 summarizes the parameters that we
calibrate directly from the data. We also assume that these parameters are symmetric
across the two countries.
In order to discipline the parameters of the banks’ eciency distribution, we start
by observing that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the empirical distribution of in-
terest revenues from loans is log-normal. In Appendix B.5, we show that if the banks’
eciency distribution is log-normal with mean µ and standard deviation σ, the distri-
bution of interest revenues from loans is approximately log-normal with mean µL =







and standard deviation σL = (ε− 1)σ. Maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the parameters of the empirical distribution of interest revenues from
loans deliver µL = 5.95 and σL = 1.93. Hence, we model a bank’s eciency as a random
draw from a log-normal distribution whose parameters µ and σ are calibrated such that:








σL = (ε− 1)σ = 1.93.
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Banks are heterogeneous, both in their eciency level and in their equity endowment.
Given that we observe nonbinding capital requirements in the data, we target a pre-crisis
calibrated economy that is populated by unconstrained banks. The empirical distribution
of equity is well-approximated by a log-normal distribution. Since the model abstracts
from uses of equity other than loans, we assume that each bank’s pre-crisis equity posi-
tion is drawn from the same distribution as its loans, scaled by the capital requirement
(k=.045) plus a 4 percent capital buer.24 We impose this buer because the 2008–2010
period coincides with the implementation of stress testing. As banks were getting ready
to undergo stress testing, their ratios of equity to risk-weighted assets increased in this
period (see Figure B·7 in the Appendix).
It remains to calibrate the relative management cost of loans versus deposits cL/cD, the
elasticity of loan demand ε, the aggregate parameters of loan demand and deposit supply
in each country (A, A∗, B, B∗, Bw, and B∗w), and the xed entry costs FS and FB . Since
we cannot calibrate these parameters directly, we assume symmetry across countries and
use the model to choose values for these parameters in order to match relevant moments
from the data. More precisely, we assume that cL/cD and ε are symmetric across countries;
that the relative sizes of loans, retail deposits, and wholesale deposits are the same across
countries: A/A∗ = B/B∗ = Bw/B∗w; and that xed costs imply the same distribution
of banks by type in each country. Symmetry assumptions also imply a link between the
relative sizes of the loan markets in each country and the subsidiary’s equity share, so
that we are left with seven parameters to be calibrated (cL/cD, ε, A∗, B∗, B∗w, FS , and
FB), for which we choose the following set of target moments:
1. The relative size of the average subsidiary/ average branch, in terms of loans;
2. The relative size of the average subsidiary/ average branch, in terms of deposits;
3. The relative presence of foreign branches versus foreign subsidiaries;
24We parameterize the buer as the average hypothetical worst loss that a bank under stress would
experience. This assumption ensures that banks are “far” from the constraint in the pre-crisis equilibrium.
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4. The share of US loans extended by subsidiaries or branches of foreign banking or-
ganizations;
5. The average interest rate on retail deposits;
6. The average interest rate on loans;
7. The average interbank market rate.
The average foreign subsidiary in our data has loans equal to 3.87 times the loans of
the average foreign branch, and deposits equal to 1.81 times the deposits of the average
foreign branch. In our merged dataset, subsidiaries account for about one-third of US-
based FBOs, and in turn FBOs account for about 30 percent of the total loans extended in
the United States. As a target for the average interest rate paid on retail deposits, we use
a 0.12 percent rate paid on checking accounts. We use LIBOR to pin down the value of
the interbank market interest rate, 0.92 percent. Finally, in the model, loans encompass
a variety of products, including mortgages, home equity, consumer, and commercial and
industrial loans. We take an average for these rates in the data and set our target average
interest rates on loans to 6.28 percent.
Table 2.5 reports the model-generated moments alongside the corresponding moments
in the data. The model does a good job at replicating the relative presence of foreign
branches versus subsidiaries and the overall size of the foreign banking sector. We un-
derpredict the relative size of loans and deposits, possibly due to an imperfect t of the
parametric eciency and size distributions. The target interest rates all t reasonably
well. The corresponding calibrated parameters are reported in Table B.3 in the Appendix.
The calibration reveals a sizable elasticity of loan demand, ε = 4.4, corresponding to an
average mark-up of 31 percent. The reported xed costs imply that the cost of opening a
subsidiary (branch) is equal to 52.3 percent (82.3 percent) of the average per-period prots
of the subsidiary (branch) itself.
Despite its conceptual simplicity, the model is dicult to compute because of the oc-
71
Table 2.5: Moments: Model versus Data
Parameters are matched to moments for the year 2010.
Moment Data Model
Nr. of Subsidiaries/Nr. of Branches 0.31 0.32
Share of US Loans issued by FBOs 30% 35%
Average Subsidiary Loans/Branch Loans 3.87 2.09
Average Subsidiary Deposits/Branch Deposits 1.81 1.39
Avg. Interest Rate On Deposits 0.12% 0.23%
LIBOR One-Year Interbank Rate 0.92% 0.84%
Avg. Interest Rate on Loans 6.28% 7.2%
casionally binding constraints and the consequent presence of corner solutions. As such,
it is hard to talk precisely about identication. This said, numerical simulations of the
model suggest that the relative number of subsidiaries versus branches and the share of
loans issued by FBOs are very sensitive to the calibration of the xed costs. Moments
related to an FBO’s relative size are important for quantifying the cost and market size
parameters.
2.4.2 Global Banks’ Organization and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis
In this section, we use the calibrated model to perform a numerical exercise with the
goal of illustrating the consequences of the European sovereign debt crisis for the global
banking sector under dierent policy scenarios.
Starting from the baseline model economy, we simulate the European sovereign debt
crisis in two dierent ways. In the rst specication, we introduce an unexpected drop in
the probability of loan repayment (to p′ = 0.964), after banks had decided on their optimal
amounts of loans and deposits based on the baseline value of p. This exercise, which we
refer to as a “3.6 percent default,” generates an average 10 percent reduction in equity
accumulation, similar in size to what we see in the data (see Figure B·7 in the Appendix).
In the second specication, we impose a homogeneous 10 percent drop in equity at the
end of the rst period, with the same average eect, but balanced across all banks. In
both exercises, the decline in bank equity reduces banks’ buers on capital requirements:
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E(a)/RWA decreases. This decline diers across banks according to the concentration
of loans in their portfolio allocations.
Table 2.6 displays the results of this exercise expressed in percentage changes from
the baseline pre-crisis economy, reporting both partial equilibrium (keeping the interbank
rate rM constant) and industry equilibrium eects (letting rM adjust). The two exercises
display similar qualitative eects. The drop in parent equity implies that wholesale deposit
supply in US-based branches decreases due to depositors’ fears about the health of the
conglomerate. In our calibrated economy, the decline in wholesale deposits ranges from 9
percent to 13 percent across the specications. As branches experience a funding shock,
their demand for borrowing increases, and intrarm borrowing from their parents (T > 0)
increases from 8 percent to 13 percent across specications. As we observe in the data, the
need for extra funding is not entirely fullled by the intrarm transfer, and loans decline
moderately between 1 percent and 3 percent in the model, less than what we observe in
the data. At the same time, consistent with our empirical observations, the balance sheet
of US-based subsidiaries is unaected by the shock that occurs in Europe, despite the large
drop in parents’ equity.25 Finally, the shock has a sizable negative eect on aggregate loans
in the United States, which experience a decline of 4 percent.
This simple exercise is consistent with the changes in the balance sheets of branches
and subsidiaries that we documented in Section 2.2, and hence raises our condence in
using the model to evaluate changes in regulatory policies. To this end, Table 2.7 illustrates
the eects of a loan repayment shock under several interesting counterfactual scenarios.
All the results are reported as percentage changes relative to the pre-crisis scenario, in
industry equilibrium.
The rst column in Table 2.7 is the same as in Table 2.6, where the shock hits the base-
25The only changes in subsidiaries’ loans and deposits are due to industry equilibrium responses to
changes in the interbank rate.
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Table 2.6: Response to a Loan Repayment Shock in the Model
Percentage changes relative to baseline pre-crisis economy.
3.6% default E′(a) = 0.9× E(a)
PE IE PE IE
Average P-B Parent Equity 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.90
Average Branch Wholesale Deposits 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.87
Average P-B Transfers 1.08 1.13 1.09 1.11
Average Branch Loans 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.98
Average P-S Parent Equity 0.81 0.81 0.90 0.90
Average Subsidiary Retail Deposits 1 0.99 1 1.00
Average Subsidiary Loans 1 1.01 1 1.01
Aggregate Loans 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Interbank Rate 0.84% 0.80% 0.84% 0.82%
Table 2.7: Response to a LoanRepayment Shock in theModel Under
Dierent Policy Scenarios
Percentage changes relative to baseline pre-crisis economy.
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line calibrated economy. In the second column, we compute the response to the shock in
the counterfactual scenario in which only subsidiarization is allowed. As expected, since
subsidiaries in the model are isolated from the shock in Europe, lending in the United
States does not decline in this scenario, while the decline in deposits is due to industry
equilibrium eects acting through interest rate changes. The “subsidiaries only” econ-
omy is associated with aggregate loans that are 6 percent higher than in the baseline case:
since subsidiaries’ activities are independent from their parents, subsidiarization prevents
the transmission of the European shock to the US economy. The third column shows the
results of the opposite scenario, in which only branching is allowed. This is the scenario
that has the most dramatic implications for the US banking sector: the shock generates a
12 percent decline in branch deposits, a 4 percent decline in branch lending, and a 6 per-
cent decline in aggregate loans. This is a substantially larger eect when compared to the
baseline case. This result is not surprising since branching is the organizational form that
most facilitates the transmission of shocks across countries. In the fourth column, we re-
port the eects of the shock under a counterfactual higher capital requirement: k = 0.06.
In the calibrated economy, this has the eect of reducing the incentives for branching,
so all global banks open subsidiaries and the results are very similar to the ones in the
subsidiaries-only case. Finally, in the last column, we illustrate the eects of the shock
under an ad hoc monetary policy intervention: after the equity decline induced by the
default, the Government makes a “helicopter drop” equal to 40 percent of the aggregate
M+. As a result of this intervention, the interbank rate decreases substantially, the trans-
fers from parents to branches increases, and lending in the United States does not decline,
contrary to the result in the baseline scenario.
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Figure 2·5: Equilibrium Prots Before and After a “Large” Shock to
Parent Equity
Source: Authors’ calculations.
2.4.3 The International Transmission of Shocks: Intensive versus ExtensiveMar-
gin Adjustments
While the analysis so far has focused on the European sovereign debt crisis, the struc-
tural model we developed in this paper allows us to think more broadly about how banks
respond to episodes of crisis and the aggregate consequences for the international trans-
mission of shocks. Figure 2·5 illustrates the implications of a generic and sizable shock to
the parent banks’ equity or revenues for the equilibrium selection in the model. The g-
ure’s left panel shows the equilibrium before the shock, with selection by eciency into
global status. The right panel illustrates selection in the post-shock economy. Following
the shock, prots drop across the distribution of banks, but banks with diering global
status show dierent responses. In particular, the fact that subsidiaries are separately
capitalized limits the ability of parent-subsidiary conglomerates to reallocate resources
internally, so the global prots of these banks are the most aected by the shock. On the
other hand, the internal capital market that allows parents and branches to easily reallo-
cate resources within the conglomerate across countries implies that their global prots




























































































Parent Equity/Assets Annual Growth
Figure 2·6: Exit and Equity Dynamics in the Data
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence and Call Reports.
Figure 2·5 implies that—for large enough shocks—it is more likely that a parent decides
to shut down a subsidiary rather than a branch. Figure 2·6 shows suggestive evidence of
this mechanism in the data. We superimpose the time series of parent equity-over-assets
growth on a histogram reporting the exit rates of US-based branches and subsidiaries of
European banks. It is clear from the gure that a) compared to branches, subsidiaries
are unconditionally more likely to exit (consistent with the presence of frictions to asset
repatriation), and b) periods of more pronounced exits tend to be periods when a parent’s
equity position declines.
Figure 2·6 provides external validity to the mechanism put forward in this paper. We
can use these insights to evaluate the pros and cons of how the two dierent organiza-
tional forms may act as vehicles for shock transmission across countries. On the one hand,
the counterfactual analysis of our model economy, based on intensive margin changes,
shows that branches transmit shocks across countries through their internal capital mar-
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ket. However, the same internal capital market allows for international intrabank real-
locations that may minimize the global consequences of a negative shock. On the other
hand, subsidiaries are isolated from shocks to their parents in terms of their balance sheet
adjustments on the intensive margin, but the presence of frictions to the internal cap-
ital market among the dierent units of the corporation makes global banks that own
subsidiaries less resilient to the shock.
These dierent responses on the intensive and extensive margins make the task of
regulating global banks extremely dicult. Our analysis reveals that regulations have to
balance a tradeo between important policy priorities: limiting the transmission of shocks
across countries and promoting the stability of large, globally important banks.
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied how dierent organizational forms of global banking—branching
and subsidiarization—shape the transmission of shocks across countries. Our analysis
focused on banks’ endogenous choice to serve foreign markets via branching or sub-
sidiarization.
We started by establishing a series of stylized facts about the cross-section of global
banks and their response to the European sovereign debt crisis. Informed by the data,
we developed a micro-founded structural model of foreign entry in the banking sector.
The model explicitly distinguishes foreign banking institutions by their mode of opera-
tions, which is endogenous and responds to dierences in cost structure, management
eciency, and banking regulations. This feature of the model allows us to highlight the
economic channels through which banks’ mode of operations matters for the extent of
the transmission of various shocks across countries.
In order to study the eects of the European sovereign debt crisis through the lens of
the theory, we calibrated the model and used it to perform a series of exercises that shed
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light on the implications of the current US regulatory framework for the extent of shock
transmission. Our most important nding claries the relationship between global banks’
organizational structure and shock transmission. We show that subsidiarization isolates
a global bank’s balance sheets by location; hence, subsidiarization minimizes contagion.
However, subsidiarization is associated with a limited internal capital market between
parent and aliate, so that the parent does not have instruments to dampen the global
eect of shocks, resulting in possible reorganizations and exits from the foreign market.
Conversely, branching can take advantage of an internal capital market within the corpo-
ration and by smoothing the shock’s eect across countries, reduces its global impact.
We see this paper as the starting point of a research agenda whose goal is to use careful
quantitative analysis to inform the banking policy discussion. There are many important
aspects of this problem which go beyond the scope of this paper, and we plan to tackle





































Appendix: Trade and Inequality: Educational
and Occupational Choices Matter
A.1 Data Construction
I collect data on wages and hours worked by skill type from the World Input Output
Database, Socio Economic Accounts (WIOD-SEA), 2013 release. The data span the years
1995 to 2009 and represent 40 countries, however, I drop Taiwan as it is not included in my
other dataset. I also drop Russia as its data series on educational attainment are imputed
from the Czech Republic and I drop Luxembourg as changes in the Labor Force Survey
render its educational attainment measure unreliable. Several other countries have impu-
tations for educational attainment at various points, but I only drop observations later in
the sample where imputed values are assumed constant due to the end of a data series. I
impute values for relative hours worked in 2003 due to a known classication error. Ex-
cluding small economies with more volatile data (Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg) from
the analysis produces similar results.
The WIOD-SEA data are constructed from micro data on hours and wages by skill
group from each country. Unfortunately, these include some imputations for years not
covered by local surveys. This is one reason I use the stacked two year dierences in my
main specication as it not only smooths year to year errors, but it better reects changes
in observed data. Nevertheless, for some countries in the later years of the sample there
is not data after a certain year. The WIOD-SEA generally assumes a constant imputation
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in this case, and I drop these observations.
Data on hours and wages in the WIOD-SEA reect, to the best eorts of the survey,
data on employees. This is reected directly in my model. The capital share is simply the
residual of GDP and the total wage bill reported in WIOD-SEA. I collect data on exports,
imports, GDP and population from the World Development Indicators (WDI). I drop In-
donesian data from 1998 as trade data from that year is an implausible outlier. Where
applicable, I use estimates of exchange rates and purchasing power parity from the WDI
to construct real 2005 dollar gures.
The capital share is calculated as a residual of GDP and the total wage bill in the
economy. As the wages and hours represent employees, this residual is equivalent to
implied prots for the self-employed or for rms.
State level data on wages, hours worked and self employment are from IPUMS-USA,
using the American Community Survey sample from 2001-2016. Skill groups are classied
according to six attainment levels, but I consolidate these denitions to reect the high-
skilled group measured in the WIOD-SEA data (high-skilled is equivalent to some college
degree). State level exports are taken from the International Trade Administration and
state level GDP data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
A.1.1 Initial Country Skill Abundance
For some analyses, I group countries as high- middle- and low-skilled based on the share
of high-skilled workers in the base year of 1995. There are intuitive break-points between
countries with at least 20% high-skilled workers or fewer than 25% low-skilled workers
constituting the high-skilled countries and countries with at least 50% low-skilled workers
constituting the low-skilled countries. I classify all countries not tting one of these cate-
gories as middle-skilled. I make an exception for Spain which has over 20% of its workers
in the high-skilled category but over 50% in the low-skilled category and classify it as
middle-skilled. Table A.1 reports the classication and share of workers in each category
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in 1995 for all countries in the sample.
Table A.1: Skill of Labor Force in 1995
Country Skill-Category %HS %MS %LS
Estonia High-skilled 33.1 57.0 9.9
South Korea High-skilled 31.2 37.0 21.7
Finland High-skilled 30.6 42.5 26.9
Cyprus High-skilled 30.0 35.9 34.1
United States High-skilled 27.9 61.4 10.7
Lithuania High-skilled 27.5 62.4 10.1
Latvia High-skilled 23.6 62.5 13.8
Denmark High-skilled 23.6 53.5 22.9
United Kingdom High-skilled 23.0 42.3 34.7
Germany High-skilled 21.8 62.2 16.0
Spain Mid-skilled 21.2 15.6 63.1
Ireland High-skilled 21.0 39.9 39.1
France High-skilled 20.8 42.0 37.2
Netherlands Mid-skilled 19.8 47.0 33.2
Japan High-skilled 19.1 65.0 16.0
Sweden High-skilled 18.8 56.4 24.8
Canada High-skilled 18.5 76.1 5.3
Greece Low-skilled 15.8 31.6 52.5
Hungary Mid-skilled 15.4 64.8 19.9
Slovenia Mid-skilled 14.5 61.9 23.6
Belgium Mid-skilled 13.9 48.9 37.2
Slovakia Mid-skilled 13.4 77.1 9.4
Mexico Low-skilled 12.4 31.6 56.0
Austria Mid-skilled 12.0 64.6 23.3
Poland Mid-skilled 11.6 71.7 16.7
Brazil Low-skilled 11.3 28.2 60.5
Australia Low-skilled 11.3 35.9 52.9
Czech Republic Mid-skilled 11.2 80.0 8.8
Malta Low-skilled 11.2 16.5 72.2
Bulgaria Low-skilled 9.3 13.2 77.5
Portugal Low-skilled 8.4 13.5 80.0
Italy Low-skilled 8.4 35.0 56.6
Romania Low-skilled 6.5 10.4 83.1
Turkey Low-skilled 6.4 13.5 80.0
India Low-skilled 4.7 24.4 70.9
Indonesia Low-skilled 3.1 14.2 82.7
China Low-skilled 2.3 25.3 72.4
This table shows the share of high-, middle- and low-skilled workers in each country in the base year,
1995. It also shows how each country is classied according to high- middle- or low-skilled.
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A.2 Robustness
I examine the sensitivity of the main results to a variety of specications on the horizon
of the dierence period, the type of trade, the denition of country skill level, and the
denition of worker skill level. As the skill premium and the share of hours worked are
dened in relative terms, I also show which components drive the main eects.
A.2.1 Alternate Short Run Horizon
I check the sensitivity of the short run analysis to the time horizon and nd they are robust
to using one, two and three year dierences.
Table A.2: Skill Premium and Skill Composition by Exports, SRDif-
ferences.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wages wages wages hours hours hours
Ex/GDP, 1yr Change 0.032 0.093**
(0.051) (0.042)
Ex/GDP, 2yr Change -0.095* 0.184***
(0.049) (0.048)
Ex/GDP, 3yr Change 0.013 0.121*
(0.058) (0.066)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
N Obs 497 249 142 497 249 142
This table shows the relationship between the changes exports and changes in the skill premium and
changes in relative high-skilled hours. Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socio-Economic
Accounts and World Bank World Development Indicators. One, two and three year log dierences.
As indicated in Columns 4-6 of Table A.2, the relationship between exports and skill
intensity remains positive and signicant using one, two or three year stacked dierences,
but as shown in Columns 1-3 there is little evidence of a relationship between exports and
the skill premium.
A.2.2 Alternate Specication of Trade
I examine whether the denition of trade matters for my short run results. While there
is good theoretical reason to emphasize exports, I also examine the results using imports
and total trade measures.
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Table A.3: Skill Premium and Skill Composition by Exports, Alter-
nate Trade Denitions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
N Obs 249 249 249 249 249 249
This table shows the relationship between the changes exports, imports, total trade and changes in the
skill premium and changes in relative high-skilled hours. Data source: World Input-Output Database,
Socieo-Economic Accounts and World Bank World Development Indicators. Two year log dierences.
Table A.3 shows the association between the the skill premium and skill intensity with
exports (Columns 1 and 4), imports (Columns 2 and 5) and total trade (Columns 3 and 6).
Though the strongest relation, in line with theory, is between skill intensity and exports,
it remains taking only imports into account.
A.2.3 Panel SpecicationwithCountry Fixed Eects, Exports andGDP Separate
I also examine sensitivity to the rst dierence specication by looking at a panel regres-
sion with country and year xed eects.
Table A.4: Skill Premium and Skill Composition by Exports, Panel.
(1) (2) (3) (4)







Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country
N Obs 249 249 249 249
This table shows the relationship between exports, the skill premium and relative high-skilled hours.
Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socieo-Economic Accounts and World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators. Data in log levels with country xed eects.
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Table A.4 shows that controlling for country xed eects and examining the data in
levels rather than changes preserves the main results. Examining GDP and exports sep-
arately also conrms the positive association between exports and skill intensity and the
lack of a relationship between exports and the skill premium.
A.2.4 Alternate Country Skill Abundance Categorizations
The main denition of country skill level denitions is outlined above, however, I also
consider two simpler denitions of country skill. In the rst, I simply group countries
as high-skilled if they have at least 20% high-skilled workers in 1995 and low-skilled if
they have less then 10% high-skilled workers in 1995. In the second, I classify countries
as high-skilled if they have fewer than 25% low-skilled workers and low-skilled if they
have greater than 50% low-skilled workers. In both cases, middle skilled represents the
residual.
Table A.5: Alternate Country Skill Classications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wages wages wages hours hours hours
Exp x Hi-S -0.116** -0.136** -0.066 0.192** 0.213*** 0.135
(0.054) (0.055) (0.070) (0.073) (0.077) (0.082)
Exp x Mid-S 0.003 -0.024 -0.055 0.100 0.082 0.153*
(0.060) (0.040) (0.048) (0.095) (0.064) (0.089)
Exp x Low-S -0.115 -0.144 -0.121* 0.207*** 0.275*** 0.219***
(0.073) (0.101) (0.070) (0.071) (0.076) (0.070)
Skill Def Main HS based LS based Main HS based LS based
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
N Obs 249 249 249 249 249 249
This table shows the impact of alternate country skill categorizations on the subgroup impact of trade
on the skill premium and skill intensity.
Table A.5 shows that the classication of skill categories has little impact for our main
conclusion that the skill premium is relatively stable for both high- and low- skilled coun-
tries while exports are positively associated with skill intensity. Columns 1 and 4 show
results for the original skill denition. Columns 2 and 5 show this for the grouping based
on the high-skill denition and Columns 3 and 6 show results for groupings based on low
skill only.
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A.2.5 Alternate Denition of High to Low Skilled Labor
Worker skill is dened as low, middle and high skilled. For my main results, I group
middle and low skilled workers together. However, high-skilled workers make up a very
small percentage of total hours in skill-scarce countries and low-skilled workers make
up a very small share in high-skilled countries. In Table A.6, I show the relationships of
interest using the main high-skill measure (Columns 1 and 4), grouping high- and middle-
skill (Columns 2 and 5) and grouping high- and middle-skill for only low-skill countries
(Columns 3 and 6).
Table A.6: Skill Premium and Skill Composition by Exports, Alter-
nate HS Denitions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
wages wages wages hours hours hours
Exports/GDP -0.095* -0.061 -0.081** 0.184*** 0.108** 0.122***
(0.049) (0.038) (0.034) (0.048) (0.042) (0.040)
HS Def HS HSMS Mixed HS HSMS Mixed
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country Country Country
N Obs 249 249 249 249 249 249
This table shows the relationship between the changes exports and changes in the skill premium and
changes in relative high-skilled hours using alternate denitions of high-skilled labor. Data source:
World Input-Output Database, Socio-Economic Accounts and World Bank World Development Indica-
tors.
As Table A.6 indicates, the near-zero association between exports and the skill pre-
mium and the positive association between trade and skill intensity remains intact with
this denition, indicating the importance of trade for moving up the skill ladder, regard-
less of where on the ladder a country’s labor force falls. For my calibration exercise, I
use this denition of high- versus low-skilled labor in order to target the most relevant
margin of skill for a given country.
A.2.6 Drivers of Skill Response to Trade
Finally, I examine what drives the relationship between exports, the skill premium and
skill intensity. Table A.7 reports the wage response for high- and low-skilled workers
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(Columns 1 and 2) and the hours response for high- and low-skilled workers (Columns 3
and 4).
Table A.7: Drivers of Skill Responses to Trade.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HS wages LS wages HS hours LS hours
Exports/GDP -0.202*** -0.107** 0.151*** -0.034
(0.068) (0.040) (0.052) (0.036)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Country Country Country Country
N Obs 249 249 249 249
This table shows the relationship between the changes exports and changes in high- and low-skilled
wages and high- and low-skilled hours. Data source: World Input-Output Database, Socio-Economic
Accounts and World Bank World Development Indicators. One, two and three year log dierences.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.7 indicate a negative association between both high- and
low-skilled wages and exports, consistent with the ndings that labor share declines in
the short run following a an increase in exports. Meanwhile, Columns 3 and 4 indicate
that the increase in the share high-skilled hours is driven by an increase in the hours
of high-skilled workers, not a decrease in low-skilled hours. Both of these ndings are
consistent with the occupational switching mechanism driving short run changes in the
skill premium and skill intensity following a trade liberalization.
A.3 Derivation of Marginal Costs












Plugging into the production function, a rm with this yields (normalizing w` = 1):
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With total costs given by:
C
(










































A.4 Equilibrium in the Open Economy
As in the case of the closed economy before dening the equilibrium, it is useful to dene
some additional notation for aggregation. First, let Pi,j(zi) be the expected contribution
a rm from country i with productivity zi to the price index, Pj in country j:






















Next, analogous to the closed economy case, dene the average production of a rm
from country i with productivity zi, Q(zi), and its average revenue, R(zi):


































As before, Equation (1.7) gives the ratio of high- to low-skilled labor at a rm of pro-
ductivity z and Equation (1.6) can be used to solve for the number of high- and low-skilled
workers that a rm of productivity zi needs to produce a given quantity q, dh(zi|q) and
d`(zi|q), respectively. Since rms face constant marginal costs, dene the average high-























− whDh(z)− w`D`(z). (A.8)
Denition 2. Equilibrium in the open economy is dened across countries by vectors
of high- and low-skilled wages ({wh,j} and {w`,j}) such that labor markets clear, vectors
of ability and productivity thresholds ({a∗j} and {z∗j }) such that agents at the education
threshold are indierent about attending school and agents at the productivity threshold
are indierent between entrepreneurship as a monopolist and the high skilled wage, and
aggregate revenues {Rj = PjQj} such that goods markets clear:
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E(Ij|s = 1) ≥ w`,j + cs,j(1− a∗j) (A.9)


























I solve the model in four steps, building on Burstein and Vogel (2016):
Inner Loop: Taking aggregate productivity, schooling costs, trade costs, competi-
tiveness and labor share parameters, schooling cutos a∗i and entrepreneurial cutos z∗i
as given, I guess the vectors of low-skilled wages, {w`,i}, and high-skilled wages, {wh,i},
in each country.
Given wages, cutos and calibrated parameters, I determine the the marginal costs for
a vector of entrepreneurial productivities and the probability of an entrepreneur starting
a rm and producing in any given country j. Using this information, I solve for the price
index in each country i. Given the price indices, wages and the number of workers of
each type and rms, I solve for aggregate revenue Ri in each country such that the goods
market clears.
I then calculate the average quantity produced and demand for high- and low-skilled
labor for each observation in the vector of entrepreneurs. From this, I calculate aggregate
demand for high- and low-skilled labor. I update my guess of wages until demand and
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wk+1`,i = f1 ∗ f2i ∗ wk`,i





Middle loops: In the inner of the two middle loops, I calculate the prots of the
marginal entrepreneur Π(z∗i ) in each country. Using a bisection method, I revise the guess
of z∗i downwards if prots exceed the high-skilled wage (Π(z∗i ) > whi) and upwards if the
high-skilled wage exceeds prots.
In the outer of the middle loops, I follow the same procedure with respect to the edu-
cation cuto, a∗i , revising it downwards if expected earnings less education costs exceed
the low-skilled wage and upwards if the low skilled wage exceeds expected earnings less
education costs at the cuto.
Outer loop: I calculate the model implied production, relative wages and relative
hours in each economy. I normalize productivity and schooling costs in the US and I
revise λ up if the US share of entrepreneurs is too large and down if it is too small. I revise
α up if the share of high-skilled workers in the US is too small and down if it is too large.
For all other countries, if the share of high-skilled workers is too small (large) relative
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to the US share, I revise schooling costs down (up). If total production is too large (small)
relative to the US share, I revise productivity down (up). If exports from country i to
country j are too large (small) I revise τi,j up (down). The functional forms of these
revisions are similar to those in the inner loop.
A.6 Eect of China’s Entry into WTO on US labor market
I examine the impact of China’s entry into the WTO on the US labor market in Table ??.
The impact on total trade is much smaller (as China is a much smaller economy than the
US in the base period this is not a surprise), however, the direction and proportional size
of the eects in the US labor market are similar to those in China.
Table A.8: Impact of China’s Entry to WTO on US labor market
Occupational
Without Occupational and Educational
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
wh/w` 0.15% 0.01% -0.10%
Nh/(N` +Nh) - 0.06% 0.09%
M/N - -0.07% -0.06%
Labor Share -0.01% -0.01% 0.01%
Export Percentage 0.45% 0.48% 0.44%
Similar to Table 1.7, I nd that occupational choice mitigates increases in the skill
premium associated with trade from only skill-bias in productivity alone in the short run
through an increase in skill intensity. It also and motivates an increase in educational
attainment in the long run, again resulting in a further increase in skill intensity.
Appendix B
Appendix: What are the Consequences of
Global Banking for the International
Transmission of Shocks? A Quantitative
Analysis
B.1 The Regulatory Framework: History and Current Status
The US Regulatory Framework has a long and complex history. We mention here those
provisions that are relevant for the treatment of banks in our model.
International Banking Act of 1978 (IBA)
The IBA instituted the principle of national treatment, subjecting foreign banks to the
same regulatory restrictions and benets as domestic banks whenever possible. Prior
to the IBA, the branches of foreign banks were not subject to federal restrictions on US
banks, such as those on interstate banking (McFadden) and the separation of commer-
cial and investment operations (Glass-Steagall). Foreign branches were not required to
meet the reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve. However, they were ineligible for
FDIC insurance, making it hard for them to compete for retail deposits. Foreign sub-
sidiaries were already under federal regulatory authority. The IBA required foreign banks
to choose a home state, then they became subject to the laws of that state and could not
set up branches or subsidiaries in any other states. They also became subject to federal
laws, which ended the competitive advantages they previously had over domestic banks.
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Under the IBA, all foreign banks that accepted retail deposits were now required to be-
come part of the FDIC insurance system, but they could opt out of this requirement by
not accepting retail deposits. These foreign branches that accepted retail deposits were
now subject to the reserve requirements set by the Federal Reserve and subject to their
examinations or that of a similar banking authority.
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of
1980
The DIDMCA expanded the inuence of the Federal Reserve to all depository institutions,
as opposed to only the approximately 40 percent of banks that were currently members
of the Federal Reserve System. This meant nonmember banks had to meet the reserve
requirements and assets and liabilities reporting requirements set by the Federal Reserve,
similar to how the IBA applied these requirements to the US operations of foreign banks.
These new requirements also allowed all depository institutions to enjoy the benets of
membership in the Federal Reserve System, including use of the discount window, a rst
for both foreign banks and nonmember banks.
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA) of 1991
The FBSEA, part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,
prohibited new foreign bank branches in the United States from having access to the
FDIC system and deposit insurance. This created a major operating dierence from a
foreign bank opening a new subsidiary, which was still able to oer deposit insurance. The
FBSEA also expanded the Federal Reserve’s authority to supervise and regulate foreign
banks. The Federal Reserve could now examine any foreign-owned banking entities in
the United States, which were now required to be examined annually by state or federal
regulators, and granted the Federal Reserve greater privilege to access information about
the parent companies. The act also allowed the Federal Reserve to terminate any unsafe
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foreign banking entity, whether it had a state or federal licence. To form a new banking
entity in the United States, a foreign bank now needed the approval of the Federal Reserve
independently of the organizational choice between a branch or a subsidiary..
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Eciency Act (IBBEA) of 1994
The IBBEA overturned the McFadden Act (1927) by allowing interstate banking. Prior
to this act, many states had passed laws allowing banks based in other states to operate
within their state under specied conditions. The IBBEA set up a national framework to
allow interstate banking under a standardized set of rules. For foreign-owned banks, this
legislation meant a parent bank could set up branches in multiple states, or a subsidiary
would be allowed to open branches in multiple states.
New Intermediate Holding Company Regulation of 2016
Starting in July, 2016, a foreign bank organization (FBO) with more than $50bn in US assets
is required to designate an intermediate holding company (IHC) that holds the FBO’s
ownership interest in any of its US subsidiaries. The IHC is then subject to the regulatory
requirements of any US bank holding company. Interestingly enough, foreign branches
are left out of the IHC regulation and branch assets do not count towards the regulatory
thresholds, nor are branches subject to US regulatory requirements like the Dodd-Frank
Act’s stress testing, Basel III capital requirements, etc. Foreign branches operating in the
United States remain subject to regulation in their home country.
B.2 Data Description
US Oce-Level Data
Our oce-level data comes from two dierent forms, FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 002. FFIEC
031 is formally known as the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank
with Domestic and Foreign Oces, often referred to as Call Reports. This is our source
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for data on the nancial positions of foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in the United
States. FFIEC 002 is formally known as the Report of Assets and Liabilities of US Branches
and Agencies of Foreign Banks, and is our source for the data on the nancial positions
of foreign-owned branches.
We complement this data with the Federal Reserve Board’s Structure and Share Data
for US Oces of Foreign Banks. The Structure Data is US oce-level data of foreign bank-
ing organizations covering selected variables from the FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 002, including
the “top-tier” foreign parent bank and country, as well as US oce type and assets. This
source allows us to identify the two types of organizational forms that are the object of
this study, branches and subsidiaries. We dene uninsured federal branches and unin-
sured state branches as “branches.” “Subsidiaries” encompass state member banks, state
nonmember banks, national banks, state savings banks, and federal savings banks. The
Share Data contains summary statistics on the fraction and level of total assets, commer-
cial and industrial loans, total loans or deposits in domestic-owned banks, foreign-owned
banks (subsidiaries) and foreign-owned branches and agencies.
Balance sheet data for subsidiaries in our sample come from the form FFIEC 031.
Specically, we construct retail deposits as the sum of rconf049, the amount of deposits
(excluding retirement accounts) of $250,000 or less, and rconf045, the amount of retirement
deposit accounts of $250,000 or less. Wholesale deposits are given by the sum of rconf051,
the amount of deposits (excluding retirement) above $250,000, and rconf047, the amount
of retirement deposit accounts above $250,000. The sum of wholesale and retail deposits
gives our measure of total deposits. Finally, rcfd2122 (loans and leases net of unearned
income) measures total net loans.
Form FFIEC 002 provides additional information on foreign-owned branches. Speci-
cally, wholesale deposits are given by rcon1653 (total deposits and credit balances in trans-
action accounts of the branch), while rcfd2122 (loans and leases net of unearned income) is
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our measure of total net loans. The intrabank transfer is computed using data on the ow
of funds between parent and branches: rcfd2944 reports the balance due to their parent
institution and rcfd2154 the balance due from their parent institution.
European Bank-Level Data
S&P Global Market Intelligence (formerly SNL Financial) is our data source on European
banks. Using bank names, we were able to match this data with the European parents
of US oces in the Structure data: there are 56 European “top-tier” parent banks in our
matched dataset. The variables we use from S&P Global Market Intelligence are total
assets (S&P Key eld 132264), total deposits (132288), total net loans (132214), interest
earned on loans (132532) and interest expense on deposits (133820.)
Exposure Data
Exposures for “top-tier” parent banks are contained in the European Banking Authority
(EBA) stress test data, which reports the total value of each bank’s holdings of sovereign
debt in each European country. Only 50 of our 56 European parents participated in these
stress tests. For this reason, we construct two dierent denitions of a parent bank’s
exposure to the European sovereign debt crisis . According to our baseline denition, any
parent bank with above median holdings of government debt from Greece, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal, or Spain is considered exposed to the crisis, while all other parent banks are
not. An alternative denition considers any parent bank in a country using the euro to
be exposed, while all other parent banks are not. This second denition does not require
EBA stress test data.
B.3 Additional Empirical Evidence
This Appendix reports additional evidence that supports the broad patterns that we doc-
ument in the body of the paper.
132
Figure B·1 shows aggregate data on the population of foreign banking organizations
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Figure B·1: Percentage of Assets, Commercial and Industrial Loans,
Total Loans, and Deposits Held in FBOs in the United States
Source: Structure Data for US Oces of Foreign Banking Organizations -
Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestic and foreign-owned US Com-
mercial Banks plus US Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks.
In Section 2.2 we show large size dierences between branches and subsidiaries of for-
eign banks. Figure B·2 illustrates that these size dierences are not driven by a few rms
holding extraordinarily large balance sheets, but hold throughout the entire distribution
of banks: the deposit, loan, and asset size distributions in foreign subsidiaries rst-order
stochastically dominate the analogous distributions in foreign branches.
To support the model’s assumption that banks “transfer” their managerial eciency
when establishing foreign operations, Figure B·3 shows that the amount of assets a foreign
bank holds in the United States is positively related to its size in its home market.



































Figure B·2: Size Distributions
Cumulative distribution functions for deposits, loans, and assets, respec-
tively, held in foreign-owned subsidiaries and branches in 2013:Q4.
Source: US Structure Data for US Oces of Foreign Banking Organiza-
tions - Selected Assets and Liabilities of Domestic and Foreign-Owned US
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Figure B·3: Size of Domestic versus Foreign Assets
Share of US assets in a parent’s total assets versus the parent’s size.
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence data for top-tier European parents
of US branches and subsidiaries, 2013.
home country to illustrate that banks from non-GIIPS countries were also involved in the
ow reversal we document in Section 2.2.
The calibration analysis presented in Section 2.4 argues that equity of European par-
ents broadly increased after the EBA’s introduction of stress testing, but fell at the onset
of the sovereign debt crisis. Figure B·7 illustrates these trends.
Finally, for completeness, Table B.1 lists the European parents included in our sample
from 2010, together with the number of branches and subsidiaries that each bank had at
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Figure B·5: Exposed Banks
Figure B·6: Net Intrarm Flows by Country of Origin
Dierence between Net due from related depository institutions and Net
due to related depository institutions (items 2 and 5, respectively, from the
“Schedule RAL-Assets and Liabilities”), broken down by parent exposure
and by country of origin.
Data source: Report of Assets and Liabilities of US Branches and Agencies
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Figure B·7: Parent Equity over Assets
Average equity over assets held in European parents of foreign banking
organizations in the United States.
Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.
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Table B.1: List of European Parents in Our Sample, Data for 2010
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B.4 Details on the Construction and Solution of the Model
B.4.1 Modeling Deposit Insurance
As described in Section 2.3, all banks accepting retail deposits in the United States have
to pay deposit insurance to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), an inde-
pendent US agency, created by Congress, in charge of insuring deposits. The main goal of
deposit insurance is to prevent bank runs. Deposit insurance also generates moral hazard
problems—since bank deposits are insured, bankers have incentives to engage in riskier
behavior. The classic way to address this moral hazard problem and ultimately reduce the
risks of bankruptcies is to price the deposit insurance at the actuarially fair rate. Thus, in
order to achieve a certain level of actuarial fairness, modern deposit insurance is not paid
as a at fee on insured deposits, but rather is assessed based on the risk prole of a bank’s
assets and funding sources. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC assessment is applied to
all assets of a bank less its tangible equity (the assessment base), so banks pay additional
insurance even if their source of additional funding is not itself insured.
Small banks are classied based on their riskiness according to the CAMELS rating
system of broad risk measures and assigned a risk category based on these measures.1
1CAMELS is a supervisory rating system developed by US regulatory agencies in which capital adequacy,
assets, management capability, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk are assigned a rating from
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Table B.2 reports the current rates by risk-category:
Table B.2: FDIC Assessment Rates by Risk Categories, in Basis
Points
Source: https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assessments/proposed.html.
I II III IV Total
Assessment Rate 2.5 to 9 9 to 24 18 to 23 30 to 45 2.5 to 45
Larger banks and complex institutions are subject to the same total range of rates,
but are assessed based on the following three factors. The CAMELS rating constitutes
30 percent of the bank’s assessment rate, and the rest of the rate is calculated according
to a formula based on factors related to asset risk and funding risk (50 and 20 percent,
respectively). The asset risk measures generally punish higher leverage, riskier classes of
assets, and asset concentration in a particular sector. The funding risk measures generally
reward having a larger share of funding from insured deposits and holding highly liquid
assets, on the theory that such funding is less likely to ee in crisis. These formulaic
measures are similar in nature to the categories assessed subjectively in the CAMELS
rating.
Our proposed reduced-form expression in equation (2.4) follows the principles of the
FDIC Current Assessment Rate Calculator for Highly Complex Institutions, available at:
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/calculator.html.
The highly complex institutions pricing scorecard lists three criteria as building blocks
of the CAMELS rating system: 1) the ability to withstand asset-related stress; 2) the ability
to withstand funding-related stress; and 3) potential loss severity. Our formulation follows
the second criterion, the ability to withstand funding-related stress:
1 (best) to 5 (worst). A rating of 5 indicates that the bank’s problems are beyond management’s ability to
control or correct.
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IP (D,L,M) = fp(D,M
−, E(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
assessment rate








· (L+M+ − E(a)), (B.1)
whereRmin > 0 and fp > 0. We abstract from the exact formulas for calculating the FDIC
assessment rate, and adopt a functional form that results in an insurance premium that is
higher the more that a bank resorts to the interbank borrowing as a share of bank equity
in order to fund its activities. This formula applies to local banks, subsidiaries, and parents
of subsidiaries. The analogous formula for parents of branches includes both parent and
branch loans in its assessment base.
B.4.2 The Bank’s Prot Maximization Problem: A Parametric Example
In order to illustrate some properties of the bank’s problem, in this section we resort to a
parametric example (which exploits the same parameterization we use in the calibration).
Like in the calibration, we assume a constant elasticity loan demand function: L(rL) =
r−εL A, where ε > 1 is the elasticity of loan demand, and A is a parameter describing the
aggregate size of the market for loans. Similarly, we assume a constant elasticity retail
deposit supply function: D(rD) = rϑDB, where ϑ > 0 is the elasticity of retail deposit
supply, and B is a parameter describing the aggregate size of the retail deposits market.
We also assume a linear separable management cost function: C(D,L) = cLL + cDD,
where cL, cD > 0. The deposit insurance premium takes the functional form described in
the previous section. Under these assumptions, if a local bank is a lender in the interbank













[(rM − acD −Rmin]
}ϑ
B, (B.3)
and maximal prots are:
piN(a) =rME(a) +H1(ε, p)[(1− p) + rM + acL]1−εA+ ...
H2(ϑ)(rM − acD −Rmin)1+ϑB, (B.4)
whereH1(·) andH2(·) are functions of model parameters only. Equation (B.4) shows that
a bank’s optimal prots are increasing in bank eciency 1/a and in the bank’s equity
E(a).
B.4.3 Constrained Equilibrium in Local Banks
In the model, the constrained equilibrium has two possible congurations, depending on
whether the bank borrows or lends in the interbank market. We describe both congura-
tions using the parameterization introduced in the previous section.
1. Constrained equilibrium with interbank lending.
If the bank is a lender in the unconstrained equilibrium (MuN > 0), it could be
also a lender in the constrained one. In this constrained equilibrium scenario, a
bank’s loans to its customers and to the interbank market enter the expression for
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2The intuition that this special example conveys is the same in the case in which a bank is a borrower
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If the resulting M c > 0, these conditions characterize the constrained equilibrium.
Otherwise, the constrained equilibrium will be one that displays interbank borrow-
ing.
2. Constrained equilibrium with interbank borrowing.
If the constrained equilibrium found above is inconsistent, or if the bank is a bor-
rower in the unconstrained equilibrium, it will also be a borrower in the constrained
equilibrium.
Under this scenario, the amount of loans is the maximum that the capital require-
ment allows:
LcN(a) = E(a)/(ωLk), (B.6)
where deposits adjust depending on the rst-order condition, and interbank bor-
rowing clears the resource requirement:








B.4.4 Modeling the Wholesale Deposits Supply
()eghoma17 show that the demand for uninsured wholesale deposits is less elastic than
the one for insured retail deposits, and that wholesale deposits are sensitive to some mea-
sure of the banking organization “distress.” We rely on their estimates and embed them
in a parametric form of wholesale deposits supply that is consistent with their ndings.
Our model-based measure of bank distress is inversely related to the additional buer on
capital requirement that banks hold in normal times, given by equity over risk-weighted
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assets (RWA) divided by the capital requirement, k. When E(a)
k·RWA = 1, the capital re-
quirement is binding and the bank experiences maximum distress, resulting in a ight of
wholesale deposits. Distress decreases as E(a)
k·RWA grows bigger than one.










where ϑw < ϑ is the elasticity of wholesale deposits, and Bw is a parameter describing
the aggregate size of the wholesale deposits market. This functional form implies that the
quantity of deposits supplied falls as the buer on the capital requirement decreases, and
that there is a complete deposits ight (D∗w = 0) when the capital requirement is binding.
For comparison purposes, Figure B·8 plots the retail deposit supply and the wholesale
deposit supply for dierent values of the buer on capital requirement.


















Wholesale Deposits (E/RWA=2k) 
Wholesale Deposits (E/RWA=1.5k)
Figure B·8: Retail and Wholesale Deposit Supply
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B.5 Details of the Calibration Procedure
B.5.1 Calibrating Banks’ Eciency Distribution
We start by assessing which parametric distribution better approximates the empirical
distribution of interest revenues from loans. We estimate the parameters of said distribu-
tion under these alternate assumptions: Pareto, log-normal, Fréchet, and Weibull. With
the estimated distributions, we run Anderson-Darling tests of the hypothesis that each
of these parametric distributions well approximates the empirical distribution. While we
can reject the hypotheses that the distribution of interest revenues from loans is Pareto,
Fréchet or Weibull, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the distribution is log-normal.
Based on this result, we need to establish a theoretical linkage between the distribution
of interest revenues from loans and the banks’ eciency distribution.
Assume that banks’ eciency x ≡ 1/a is distributed log-normal: log(x) ∼ N (µ, σ).
In the unconstrained equilibrium, and under the assumption that a bank is lending in the
interbank market, revenues from domestic loans are:
rL · L =
[
ε
p(ε− 1)[acL + rM + (1− p)]
]1−ε
A. (B.9)
Assuming that the term (rM + 1− p) is “small” relative to acL, revenues from loans can
be approximated as:












log(rL · L) ≈ log(H) + (ε− 1) log(x),
where log(x) ∼ N (µ, σ) implies that log(rL·L) ∼ N (µL, σL). As a result, the distribution
of interest revenues from loans can be approximated by a log-normal distribution with
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parameters:
µL = (ε− 1)µ+ log(H) (B.10)
σL = (ε− 1)σ. (B.11)
The maximum-likelihood estimates, conditional on the distribution of the interest rev-
enues from loans being log-normal, deliver µL = 5.96 and σL = 1.93. Then we impose
that µL = (ε− 1)µ+ log(H) = 19.78 and σL = (ε− 1)σ = 1.93 in the calibration.
B.5.2 Jointly Calibrated Parameters
Table B.3 reports the parameters that are calibrated to match the moments of interest.
The implied parameters of the eciency distribution, from equations (B.10) and (B.11),
are µ = 5.4, σ = 0.57.
Table B.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Denition Value
cL/cD Unit Management Cost 12.5
ε Elasticity of Loan Demand 4.4
A∗ Loan Demand Shifter 5.52× 10−2
B∗ Retail Deposit Demand Shifter 1.28× 105
B∗w Wholesale Deposit Demand Shifter 2.31× 104
FS Fixed Cost of Subsidiarization 167
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